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I. ACCOUNTING
A. Accounting Methods
1. Tax Court judicially creates "time value of money"
limitations on deductions. Ford Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C.
87 (1/31/94) (reviewed, 14-3). Taxpayer purchased in 1980 a number of
single premium annuities for $4 million to fund its liability on a
total of $24 million of periodic payments arising from tort claim
structured settlements. The Commissioner determined (in a year not
governed by the §461(h) economic performance rules) that any deduction
in excess of the amount paid for the annuities would not clearly
reflect income under §446(b), and the court held that the Commissioner
did not abuse her discretion. The court based its determination upon
a calculation based upon taxpayer's claimed deductions, which showed
that the taxpayer was better off because the accidents occurred.
Dissent on the ground that the "all events" test was met, and §461(h)
is inapplicable.
a. *Sixth Circuit affirms Tax Court's ratification
of Commissioner's §446(b) discretion. Ford Motor Co. v. Commissioner,
71 F.3d 209, 95-2 U.S.T.C. 50,643 (6th Cir. 12/5/95), aff'g 102 T.C.
87 (1994). Pre-1984 Act accrual of deductions for full amounts of
structured settlement agreements made in settlement of automobile
accident claims against taxpayer was subject to Commissioner's
invocation of her §446(b) authority to change taxpayer from the
accrual method to a modified cash basis method -- held to be more
favorable to taxpayer than a straight cash method -- with respect to
20 structured settlement agreements. Taxpayer deducted the $10.6
million of payments due under fixed period agreements [with respect to
periods of up to 58 years] -- and contended it was entitled to deduct
$24.4 million of payments due under both fixed period agreements and
lifetime payment agreements [basing lifetime payment agreements upon
life expectancy] -- but paid only $4.4 million to fund single premium
annuity contracts that covered all payments due under all 20
structured settlement agreements.
(1) The court held that neither (1) the
taxpayer's satisfying the all events test, nor (2) the enactment in
the 1984 Act of the §461(h) economic performance requirement "to take
into account the time value of money," preempted the Commissioner's
t I would like to thank Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Leatherman Professor of Law,
University of Kentucky College of Law, Lexington, Kentucky for his wise
suggestions for revision of this outline.
* Item of particular interest.
§446(b) authority [on a case-by-case basis] to determine that
taxpayer's method of accounting in this pre-1984 Act year did not
clearly reflect income. 71 F.3d at 213-14.
(2) The length of the payment periods would,
under taxpayer's method of accounting, lead to the result that the tax
benefit from the deduction would fund the full amounts due in future
years and leave taxpayer with a profit. Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v.
United States, 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1969), followed. 71 F.3d at 215-
16.
(3) Limited holding. The Sixth Circuit held
that the case-by-case approach of the Tax Court's opinion properly
served to limit its holding "to extreme cases such as this one in
which the economic results are grossly different from the tax
results," and did not "allow the Commissioner arbitrary or
unprincipled discretion." Id. at 216.
2. Berger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-76 (2/22/96).
If an interest in a sole proprietorship is transferred pursuant to a
divorce, §1041 does not preclude the application of §446(b) to require
the transferor to include previously received but unaccrued income
items.
3. *If taxpayer's method clearly reflects income,
Commissioner cannot use §446(b) to put taxpayer on a method that more
clearly reflects income. Hospital Corp. of America v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1996-105 (3/7/96). Large chain of for-profit hospitals
permitted to use a hybrid method first proposed by an appeals officer
during an earlier-year audit [i.e., the percentage of patient
receivables to be included in income was equal to the ratio of (a)
total revenue in the supply and pharmacy accounts to (b) the total of
all patient revenue] because it did clearly reflect the hospital's
income, so Commissioner's proposed change under §446(b) to an overall
accrual method was an abuse of discretion -- even if the overall
accrual method more clearly reflects income. (Note: Taxpayer used an
accrual method for financial reporting purposes.) The cost of supplies
constituted about 15 percent of expenses, and about the same
percentage of revenues in each of the years in question. While the use
of the hybrid method resulted in a disparity between the income
reported under that method and the income that would have been
reported under an overall accrual method, the court was satisfied that
the hospitals did not attempt to create any distortion and the
hospitals did not attempt to create any distortion. Judge Wells
rejected the Commissioner's contention that the taxpayer must show a
"substantial identity of results" between the hybrid method it used
and the accrual method the Commissioner determines accurately reflects
taxpayer's income, because that test is not required to be met under
Ansley-Sheppard-Burgess Co. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 367 (1995). (The
years in controversy pre-date §448, added by the Tax Reform Act of
1986, which prohibits large C corporations engaged in service business
from using the cash method of accounting.)
a. Section 481(a) adjustment is accelerated when
hospital to which it relates is sold. Hospital Corp. of America v.
Commissioner, 107 T.C. No. 6 (9/12/96). Sale of hospitals requires
acceleration of §481(a) adjustment made when hospitals were sold.
Judge Wells found that there was a cessation of the business of the
hospital sold [although the selling corporation continued to operate
other hospitals], so the balance the §481(a) adjustment may not be
spread over the remaining years of the 10-year period of adustment.
b. You might not believe it when you get your bill,
but hospitals do not "sell" medical supplies so they may use the §448
nonaccrual-experience method to account for uncollectible amounts.
Hospital Corp. of America v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. No. 8 (9/17/96).
Taxpayers were entitled to elect the § 448 nonaccrual-experience
method for years 1987 and 1988 for calculating their uncollectible
amounts because the do not "sell" medical supplies to their patients,
but they are furnished to patients as part of the hospitals'
furnishing medical services. Judge Wells held further that taxpayers
were required to use the amended Temp. Reg. §1.448-2T(e) (2) to compute
the excluded amount, as opposed to the original temporary regulation;
under the amended temporary regulation, the "uncollectible amount" is
equal to the year-end receivables multiplied by a fraction equal to
(1) "total bad debts sustained during the current and 5 preceding
years divided by (2) total accounts receivable earned throughout the
same 6-year period, not merely (1) total bad debts divided by (2)
total year-end accounts receivable (which would have been the result
under the traditional former §166(c) bad debt reserve computed under
the Black Motor [v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 300 (1940), aff'd on
another issue, 125 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1942)] formula).He noted that
the ambiguous statute [§448(d) (5)] and legislative history left a gap
that was properly filled by the amended temporary regulation,
following Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Research Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), because "the choice among reasonable
interpretations if for the Commissioner, not the courts."
4. *Commissioner does not have discretion under §446(b)
to determine whether taxpayer's method of accounting clearly reflects
income. Travelers Insurance Co. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 138, 96-
1 U.S.T.C. 50,231 (Fed. Cl. 3/21/96). Taxpayer, a life, health and
accident insurance company taxed under subchapter L, used a particular
method to convert Canadian dollars account items from its Canadian
branch operations into U.S. currency in several pre-1986 Act [which
added §987 to the Code] years. The Commissioner determined that the
method used for reporting income from taxpayer's Canadian operations
did not accurately reflect income, and imposed another method under
her §446(b) authority. The court held that, parsing §446(b), that two
different levels of judicial review of the Commissioner's
determinations are contemplated. The first is whether taxpayer's
regularly used method of accounting clearly reflects income, which is
not subject to the Commissioner's opinion and is to be reviewed de
novo. It is only the second determination of what alternative method
does clearly reflect income that is subject to the "opinion of the
Secretary" and is to be accorded deference. (The court then found that
taxpayer's method did clearly reflect income because it followed Rev.
Rul. 75-107, 1975-1 C.B. 32, and nothing in that ruling precludes its
use for life insurance companies.) The court did not invalidate Reg.
§1.446-1(a) (2) [". . . no method of accounting is acceptable unless,
in the opinion of the Commissioner, it clarly reflects income."
(emphasis added)], as it might have under the reasoning of RLC
Industries Co. v. Commissioner, 95-2 U.S.T.C. 150,328 (9th Cir.
6/19/95), aff'g 98 T. C. 457 (1992), where the Commissioner by
regulations assumed more discretion than the statute allows for.
5. Insolvent accrual basis taxpayer not allowed to deduct
debt. KelloQQ v. United States (In re Southwestern States Marketinq
Corp.), 77 AFTR2d 96-590 (5th Cir. 3/4/96) (unpublished). Bankrupt
(and hopelessly insolvent) accrual basis taxpayer may not deduct a $41
million debt [based upon a DOE claim for price regulation violations
and improper crude oil overcharges] to generate a net operating loss
carryforward [from 1978 to the years 1979 to 1984, which would lead to
an $11 million refund] because taxpayer could never pay the claim
because §446(b) [accounting method that does not accurately reflect
taxpayer's income] justifies disallowing a deduction for such an
obligation.
6. Section 467 rental agreements
a. *Regulations proposed under §467. IA-292-84,
proposed regulations under §467, relating to the treatment of rent and
interest provided for in certain leases of tangible property (61 F.R.
27834, 6/3/96).
b. *Section 467 level rent provisions interpreted:
allocation existed so taxpayer not required to use §467 level rents.
Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. v. United States, 96-2 U.S.T.C. 50,487,
(Fed. Cl. 8/19/96). In the first case interpreting the §467 level rent
provisions, summary judgment granted to the government. Taxpayer had a
number of long-term leases which provided for escalating fixed rents
[which were section 467 rental agreements"], so in the early years of
those leases the amount of average annual rent was greater than the
amount of fixed rent actually paid. Taxpayer's original 1986 and 1987
returns deducted the rent actually paid, but claims for refund on
Forms 1120X reflected deductions of the average annual rent; however,
taxpayer did not file an application for change of accounting method
on Form 3115. Held, even if taxpayer were correcting an erroneous
accounting method, its retroactive change to the straight-line method
of computing its rental deduction still required the Commissioner's
consent. On the §467 issue, the court held that the lease did contain
allocation provisions, i.e., the rent payment schedule was adequate to
constitute an allocation of a specific amount of rent to each
particular year, so use of the straight-line method was not required
[unless the Service successfully asserts that taxpayer had a tax
avoidance purpose].
c. *Reasonable rent holiday found under §467.
Republic Plaza Properties Partnership v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. No.
7(9/16/96). Taxpayer/lessor was entitled to accrue rent for an office
building pursuant to the terms of the lease, which provided for zero
rent during the first 11-1/2 months of a 24-year, 11-1/2 month lease
because the period of zero rent qualifies as a reasonable rent holiday
described in §467(b) (5) (C). Judge Chiechi found, based in part on
expert testimony, that the zero-rent period granted in the lease was
consistent with current [1988] commercial practice in the Denver
office market, and that it "enhanced the ability of [related tenant],
as sublessor, to grant rent holidays that were consistent with
commercial practice."
B. Inventories
1. Rotable spare parts held to be depreciable capital
assets, reversing Apollo Computer. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United
States, 71 F.3d 398, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 150,046 (Fed. Cir. 12/7/95), rev'g
Apollo Computer, Inc. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 334 (1994).
Rotable spare parts used to repair customers' computers [used only for
repairs and kept separate from taxpayer's regular manufacturing
inventory] were §1231 assets eligible for depreciation -- and were not
inventory -- because they were not furnished to a customer in exchange
for a purchase price, but were used to enable taxpayer to provide
better service by avoiding the computer downtime that would be
suffered if the customer's original part was merely repaired. The
discretion the Commissioner has under §471(a) to order inventory
accounting was held to be "not unlimited."
a. Apollo Computer, Inc. v. United States, 32 Fed.
Cl. 334, 95-1 U.S.T.C. 50,015 (12/7/94), rev'd, 71 F.3d 398, 96-1
U.S.T.C. 50,046 (Fed. Cir. 12/7/95). The Commissioner had discretion
under §§446(b) and 471 to change the "fixed asset method" used by
taxpayer for its rotable spare parts (under which acquisition costs
were capitalized and then depreciated) because that method did not
clearly reflect income. Her putting the taxpayer on an inventory
method for the rotable spare parts was proper because the parts were
either held for sale or otherwise classifiable as inventory.
2. United States v. Standard, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,302, 77
A.F.T.R.2d 96-2071 (9th Cir. 4/26/96) (not officially reported), as
amended on denial of rehearing, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11807 (5/22/96).
The Ninth Circuit applied Max Sobel Wholesale Liquors v. Commissioner,
630 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980), and held that §162(c) (2) applies only to
deductions, and does not apply to expenditures to be included in the
cost of goods sold. Accordingly one count of the taxpayer-attorney's
§7206(1) criminal tax fraud conviction, for including illegal referral
payment in cost of goods sold of legal services, was reversed. The
court did not discuss the flush language of §263A(a), which bars
capitalization into basis of a capital expenses that would not have
been deductible by virtue of §162(c) (2) if the expenses had been
deductible.
C. Installment Method
1. Kohler Co. v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 379, 95-2
U.S.T.C. 50,600 (Fed. Cl. 11/3/95). Taxpayer's income was not clearly
reflected when its newly-formed subsidiary used the LIFO method of
accounting and treated goods purchased at a substantial discount
(comprising the entire opening inventory of the subsidiary) the same
as goods later manufactured for inventory purposes. Section 481
adjustments were upheld. Hamilton Industries v. Commissioner, 97 T.C.
120 (1991), followed.
2. *When sole shareholder/only employee is imprisoned,
paintings are no longer inventory. Andrew Crispo Gallery, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 86 F.3d 42, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,313 (2d Cir. 6/13/96).
Taxpayer was entitled to use the installment method to defer
recognition of profits derived from an auction of paintings seized and
sold by the IRS because it no longer held the paintings primarily for
sale to customers in its trade or business after the imprisonment of
its sole shareholder for tax fraud. Query: When does inventory of a
defunct business become a capital asset?
D. Year of Receipt or Deduction
1. *Taxpayer guaranteed that property transferred to
settlement trust would yield $115 million; taxpayer was enabled to
deduct that amount in the year of transfer although property
transferred was worth only $89.1 million. Valero Energy Corp. v.
Commissioner, 78 F.3d 909, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 150,076 (5th Cir. 2/6/96) (2-
1). Holds that a deduction of $115 million in 1979 -- arising from the
transfer of $89.1 million in securities to a settlement trust for the
benefit of customers [which trust was guaranteed by taxpayer in the
settlement to eventually yield at least $115 million] established
after Texas Railroad Commission determination that taxpayer's
customers were due refunds in excess of $1.6 billion -- was inclusive
of a $19.8 million payment taxpayer made in 1984 when it became clear
that the trust would receive only $95.2 million from the proceeds of
the securities. (It appears that the settlement trust was a grantor
trust, set up for the reason that the customers [cities and municipal
utilities] were not permitted by law to hold securities.) Therefore,
the $19.8 million payment was nondeductible in 1984. Dissent on the
ground that the $115 million deduction in 1979 was improper under the
"all events" test [and known by the Commissioner to be improper before
the statute of limitations expired for that year) and, therefore, the
deduction of $19.8 million was proper in 1984.
2. *Bank credit card annual membership fees reportable
ratably over 12-month period . Barnett Banks of Florida, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 106 T.C. No. 4 (2/29/96) (Parker, J.). Refundable
[ratably] bank credit card annual membership fees constitute payments
for services rendered of made available to cardholders [and not
additional interest], so (under Rev. Proc. 71-21, 1971-2 C.B. 549)
taxpayer may report these fees in income ratably over the 12-month
period after receipt.
a. . . . except where contract provides they were
immediately earned. Compare, Signet Banking Corp. v. Commissioner, 106
T.C. No. 5 (2/29/96) (Colvin, J.). Nonrefundable bank credit card
annual membership fees, which were paid in consideration of the
issuance of a card and the establishment of a credit limit, must be
reported in income in the year of receipt.
3. *Payment made to settle a take or pay contract held to
be an advance payment, not a deposit. Herbel v. Commissioner, 106 T.C.
No. 22 (6/5/96). Taxpayers were the shareholders of Malibu Petroleum,
Inc., an S corporation which purchased working interests in various
gas wells that were subject to a gas purchase contract with Arkla as
buyer. To avoid litigation over a take or pay provision in the
contract, Arkla paid $1,850,000 to Malibu, but reserved the right to
recoup the payment from future gas purchases under the contract. The
payment was refundable if Malibu cancelled the contract or if the
property was depleted before recoupment. Held, the $1,850,000 is an
advance payment for the purchase of gas -- and not a deposit -- so it
is includable in Malibu's income in the year received. The payment was
not a mere deposit under Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light,
493 U.S. 203 (1990), because the payor had no control over the
conditions triggering a refund. Judge Whalen further held that the
payment was not a §636(a) production payment [which would be treated
as a loan] because Congress intended [and Reg. §1.636-3(a) (1)
provided] that only production payments which constituted an economic
interest in the mineral in place would so qualify.
4. Tax Court finds Reg. §1.267(a)-3 invalid. Tate & Lyle,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. No. 37 (11/15/94) (reviewed, 9-7).
Accrual method taxpayer permitted to deduct interest owed to its [for
this purpose under U.K. law, cash method] U.K. parent in the [1985-
1987] year in which it was accrued even though the payee was not taxed
on the interest in the year accrued by either the U.S. [the interest
was exempted from income under the U.S.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty] or the
U.K. The government and dissenters argued that under §267(a) (2) [added
in 1984] an accrual basis taxpayer is not entitled to deduct accrued
interest payable to a related person that was not currently includable
in the payee's income, and under §267(a) (3) [added in 1986] Treasury
was authorized to issue regulations to apply that matching principle
where the payee was not a U.S. person; the legislative Reg. §1.267(a)-
3 was issued in 1992 under that authority. Judge Ruwe's "majority"
opinion held: (1) the regulation as applied here was invalid because
the accrued interest was not includable "by reason of the payee's
method of accounting," but by reason of the treaty [emphasis in
original]; and (2) the retroactive application of the 1992 legislative
regulation to the 1985-1987 years violated the Due Process Clause,
citing United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 94-1 U.S.T.C.
60,169 (1994). Note: 4 of the 9 judges in the majority disagreed with
the retroactivity holding.
a. Third Circuit reverses, finds regulation valid.
Tate & Lyle, Inc. v. Commissioner, 87 F.3d 99, 96-2 U.S.T.C. 950,340
(3d Cir. 6/24/96). The regulation is valid because it is a permissible
construction of the statute and is supported by the legislative
history. The court further held that the regulation could be
promulgated with retroactive effect under §7805(b) in the Secretary's
discretion, and that discretion was not abused because taxpayer had
adequate notice within a reasonable time that regulations would be
forthcoming which could alter the tax treatment of its interest
deductions.
5. *Tax Court decides that refundable entry fees are not
prepaid rents. Highland Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. No. 12
(4/17/96). Refundable entry fees received by retirement community do
not constitute prepaid rent or advance payments that must be reported
in the year of receipt, but may be included in income as they become
nonrefundable, following Commissoner v. Indianapolis Power & Light,
493 U.S. 203 (1990). But the taxpayer was required to include gains on
sales transactions in which it conveyed to residents cluster homes
even though the taxpayer was unconditionally obligated to repurchase
the homes at not less than 76 percent of the original sales price upon
the purchaser's death or whenever the purchaser decided to sell. The
formalities of the transaction indicated that they were true sales
even though - because of the taxpayer's obligation to repurchase the
homes, coupled with a prohibition on resale by the purchaser to anyone
other than the taxpayer - it was assured that the purchaser would
never realize any appreciation in value.
6. Billing is ministerial act, no method that requires
billing is not necessary for accrual when performance is complete.
Frank's Casing Crew and Rental Tools Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1996-413 (9/16/96). Delayed accrual of income until after billing
[when the performance of the sales and services had been completed in
an earlier year] by an oil field contractor [who sells oil pipes,
leases equipment used in oil fields, and provides crews necessary to
operate the leased equipment] violated the all-events test because
billing is a "ministerial act" and the income accrued in the year of
completion of performance of the sales and services, so Commissioner
did not abuse her discretion in changing taxpayer's method of
accounting. Judge Laro distinguished Decision Inc. v. Commissioner, 47
T.C. 58 (1966), because performance of taxpayer's contract in that
case occurred after the billing date, noting that when the Tax Court
had previously upheld deferred billing practices, it had done so when
the "taxpayers generally operated in a heavily regulated industry or
were able to establish wide acceptance within their industry of such
an accounting practice."
II. BUSINESS INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A. Depreciation, Depletion and Credits
1. Taxpayer not permitted to follow the literal language
of the regulations. Exxon Corp. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. No. 33
(6/6/94). Taxpayer was not permitted to follow the literal language of
Reg. §1.613-3(a) and use "representative market or field prices"
(RMFP) in determining "gross income from the property" for purposes of
computing percentage depletion under §613A(b) (1) (B) ["fixed contract"
exception]. Even though the regulation states that "the gross income
from the property shall be assumed to be equivalent to RMFP" with
respect to natural gas transported from the premises prior to sale,
the purpose of that provision was to prevent integrated producers from
taking depletion deductions on transportation, refining, etc. -- and
not to permit taxpayer to take depletion based upon a RMFP price five
times the actual sales price of the natural gas to an Exxon affiliate.
The actual contract sales price was therefore reduced by royalties and
transportation expenses to determine "gross income from the property."
a. Exxon Corp. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 250,
95-1 U.S.T.C. 50,245 (Fed. Cl. 4/11/95). On the same issue, held,
that while the amount upon which depletion can be taken is not
necessarily limited by actual gross income [21 cents], the RMFP
calculated by Exxon [41 cents] was not a reasonable basis upon which
depletion may be taken and [based upon the burden of proof] the
complaint was dismissed. But reversed ....
b. Federal Circuit holds that RMFP which exceeds
actual gross receipts is not precluded, nor is an "unreasonable" RMFP.
Exxon Corp. v. United States, 88 F.3d 968, 96-2 U.S.T.C. 50,324 (Fed.
Cir. 6/20/96), rev'g and remanding 33 Fed. Cl. 250, 95-1 U.S.T.C.
50,245 (Fed. Cl. 1995). Court finds taxpayer entitled to calculate
its depletion deduction based upon an RMFP of 39 cents based upon the
wellhead price that would be realized by nonintegrated producers. The
court further held that the Court of Federal Claims should not have
limited the price by making an independent assessment of the
reasonableness of the price because the §611(a) language "reasonable
allowance ... in each case" refers to the different types of
depletable resource, not to individual taxpayers.
2. ACRS depreciation allowed for old fiddlesticks used by
professional violinists. Simon v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 247 (8/22/94)
(reviewed, 10-7). Taxpayers were entitled to depreciation deductions
for their 19th-century violin bows used in their trade or business as
full-time professional violinists because the bows are §168 recovery
property (in that they are tangible personal property placed in
service after 1980 that suffered wear and tear attributable to use in
their profession).
a. Judge Laro's majority opinion distinguished
Browning v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-293, aff'd, 890 F.2d 1084,
89-2 U.S.T.C. 9666 (9th Cir. 1989), which denied depreciation
deductions to violins, in that there was no evidence of wear and tear
presented by taxpayer in that case, but there was evidence here of
such wear and tear. 103 T.C. at 264. In answer to the government's
argument that excessive depreciation would be allowed if these antique
violin bows could be depreciated over a relatively short period, the
court noted that Noyce v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 670 (1991) rejected
the argument that depreciation deductions must be reasonable in
amount.
b. Judge Ruwe's concurring opinion noted that ACRS
eliminated the obligation by taxpayer to establish an asset's useful
life in order to qualify for a §168 deduction.
c. Judge Hamblen's dissenting opinion contends that
the violin bows are treasured "works of art" that are inherently
nondepreciable, and that §168 allows depreciation only to property
that is "of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation
provided in §167," and that is only where the wear and tear (or
obsolescence) causes a corresponding reduction in the value of an
asset and diminishes its useful life.
d. To the same effect is Liddle v. Commissioner, 103
T.C. 285 (8/22/94) (reviewed, 9-8) (ACRS depreciation deduction
allowed for 17th-century Ruggeri bass viol used by full-time
professional musician; dissent asks what will stop wealthy taxpayers
from "stuffing ... their offices with valuable antique furniture which
they may write off over the 7-year recovery period now applicable to
office furniture?").
e. Liddle affirmed by Third Circuit. Liddle v.
Commissioner, 65 F.3d 329, 95-2 U.S.T.C. 50,488 (3d Cir. 9/8/95).
Affirms Tax Court decision allowing depreciation under §168 ACRS of a
300-year old bass violin. The court held that ACRS was meant to
eliminate the questions that surround the estimation of useful life of
depreciable property, and that there was no importation of the §167
regulation requirement [that there be a determinable useful life] into
§168 [as it existed before the Tax Reform Act of 1986] by reason of
the provision defining recovery property as "tangible property of a
character subject to the allowance for depreciation."
f. Simon affirmed by Second Circuit. Simon v.
Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41, 95-2 U.S.T.C. 50,552 (2d Cir. 10/13/95) (2-
1). One-hundred-year-old violin bows [purchased in 1985 for $30,000
and $21,000 in excellent condition and appraised in 1990 for $45,000
and $35,000 as collectibles despite their deteriorated condition] were
depreciable under ACRS in 1989. The 2d Circuit held it sufficient that
the bows were subject to wear and tear in the hands of taxpayers [who
were professional musicians], despite a Tax court finding that the
bows had "no determinable useful life," because ACRS "eliminated the
need to adjudicate matters such as useful life and salvage value."
Before ERTA (1981), property was depreciable only if taxpayer could
demonstrate a "determinable useful life," and §168 was to apply only
to "property of a character subject to the allowance for
depreciation." The court was troubled, but not deterred, by the ERTA
Conference Report that stated, "Assets that do not decline in value on
a predictable basis or that do not have a determinable useful life
are not depreciable."
g. *AOD CC-1996-009, nonacquiescence in Simon v.
Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995), as well as in Liddle v.
Commissioner, 65 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 1995), on the ground that the
enactment of ACRS merely shortened the recovery period over which an
asset is depreciated, but did not convert assets that formerly were
not depreciable into assets that are depreciable. The IRS position is
that the cases were wrongly decided and the issue should be pursued in
other circuits.
3. *ACRS depreciation allowed for exhibited "exotic" cars
based upon obsolescence. Selig v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-519
(10/31/95). Taxpayer, who was in the limousine leasing business,
purchased for $400,000 in 1987 three "exotic" cars that were never
driven, but were only displayed in car shows and used for promotional
photography. The cars included a Gambella Ferrari Testarossa that cost
$290,000 and two Lotuses. Judge Halpern held that ACRS depreciation on
the cars was allowable for years 1987-1990 because, even though not
subject to wear and tear, the cars would become obsolete over time and
could no longer be shown as the "latest" exotic cars.
4. Real property leasehold improvements held not within
ADR system. Walgreen Co. v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 582 (11/10/94).
Leasehold improvements, to the extent they were §1250 property, were
not within the ADR system and had to be depreciated as such (except to
the extent they were explicitly prescribed into an asset guideline
class by regulation, which they were not). But
a. *. . . reversed because pre-ACRS classification
rulings continue to be in effect. Walgreen Co. v. Commissioner, 68
F.3d 1006, 95-2 U.S.T.C. 50,562 (7th Cir. 10/17/95), rev'g and
remanding 103 T.C. 582 (1994). Leasehold improvements, such as
interior partitions, millwork, acoustic ceilings, floor finishing, and
bathroom and lighting fixture, that were "section 1250 property" could
nevertheless be 10-year ACRS property to the extent they were
classified as "Wholesale and Retail Trade" property -- and not
"Building Services" property -- under the pre-ERTA Asset Depreciation
Range system.
b. *Nevertheless, the Commissioner gets her victory.
On remand, T.C. Memo. 1996-374 (8/13/96). The Tax Court determined
whether any of taxpayer's leasehold improvements are section 1250
property not classified in Class 65.0 (Building Services), in which
event taxpayer is entitled to depreciate it over a 10 year useful life.
The court finds interior partitions, ceilings, lighting fixtures and
interior floor finishes, all to be Building Services items, with only
decor finishes (primarily the decorative canopy system for the
restaurants) classified as Wholesale and Retail Trade property. The
court refused to address taxpayer's argument that it was not in the
business of providing building services, so none of the property in
question falls in that category.
5. *Permission for automatic change of method where
taxpayer has claimed less depreciation than allowable; all the
unclaimed depreciation is allowable in the year of change. Rev. Proc.
96-31, 1996-20 I.R.B. 11. Procedure for requesting an automatic change
in method of computing depreciation or amortization where taxpayer has
claimed less depreciation or amortization than allowable. Form 3115
must be submitted to IRS within 180 days of the beginning of the year
and copy attached to timely filed tax return. Section 481(a)
adjustment (usually negative) to be taken into account in one year.
6. Research and development cost allocation regulation
amended. T.D. 8646, 1996-8 I.R.B. 10 (12/21/95). Amendments to final
regulation §1.861-8, relating to the allocation and apportionment of
research and experimental expenditures for purposes of determining
taxable income from sources within and without the United States.
7. Court decides difference between progress payments
(loans) and advance payments (includable in income). Fairchild
Industries Inc. v. United States, 71 F.3d 868, 95-2 U.S.T.C. 50,633
(Fed. Cir. 11/29/95). Although §44F research credit is not available
for research "funded by another person" (and Reg. §1.41-5(d) (1) sets
the criterion for "funded" as whether the payment for research is
"contingent on [its] success"), taxpayer was entitled to the credit
for research paid for by the U.S. government's "fixed-price incentive
contract" [under which progress payments were refundable in the event
of failure]. (In government contracts, a "progress payment" is a loan
(not includable in income), but an "advance payment" is includable in
income. Presumably advance payments are not refundable.)
8. 1996 Legislation
a. *Increase in dollar limitation for §179
expensing. Small Business Tax Act [see XIV., below, for full citation]
("SBT") §1111 amends §179 to increase the dollar limitation for
expensing depreciable business assets in stages from $17,500 to
$18,000 in 1997; to $18,500 in 1998; to $19,000 in 1999; to $20,000 in
2000; to $24,000 in 2001 and 2002; and to $25,000 in 2003 and
thereafter.
b. *Gas station convenience stores are 15-year
property. SBT §1120 amends §168(e)(3)(E) by adding "gas station
convenience stores" to "retail motor fuels outlets" already included
as 15-year property. Effective for property placed in service on or
after the date of enactment, with an election to apply the provision
retroactively.
c. *Favorable treatment of abandonment of landlord's
leasehold improvements at lease termination. SBT §1121 amends
§168(i) (8) to permit the deduction of remaining adjusted basis of
leasehold improvements made by the lessor (and irrevocably disposed of
or abandoned by the lessee) at the time or the termination of the
lease. This differs from the IRS position under prior law that
leasehold improvements made by a lessor that constitute structural
components must be continued to be depreciated in the same manner as
the underlying real property, even if those improvements are retired
at the end of the lease term. (Note that leasehold improvements made
by the lessee, but not retained, are taken into account to compute
gain or loss by the lessee at the termination of the lease.) Effective
for leasehold improvements disposed of after 6/12/96, with no
inference intended as to the proper treatment of such dispositions
made before 6/13/96.
d. New "work opportunity tax credit" replaces
targeted jobs credit. SBT §1201 amends §51 to replace the 40 percent
targeted jobs credit with the 35 percent "work opportunity tax
credit," applicable to qualified individuals who begin work after
9/30/96 and before 10/1/97. An eighth category of food stamp
recipients is added to the seven existing targeted groups.
e. Research credit extended through 5/31/97. SBT
§1204 extends the §41 research credit for 11 months, for the period
7/1/96 through 5/31/97. It also allows for an elective alternative
research credit regime (with lower fixed base percentages and lower
credit rates).
f. Extension of §29 credit for synthetic fuel from
coal and gas from biomass. SBT §1207 extends the placed-in-service
date by 18 months from "before 1/1/97" to "before 7/1/98" (and the
binding contract date by one year from "before 1/1/96" to "before
1/1/97") for the §29 tax credit on producing synthetic fuel from coal
and producing gas from biomass.
g. Possessions credit terminated. SBT §1601
terminates the §936 Puerto Rico and possessions tax credit, effective
for taxable years beginning after 12/31/95, with phase-out rules
through taxable years beginning before 1/1/02.
h. *Amendments to the income forecast method of
depreciation. SBT §1604 adds new §167(g), which makes amendments to
the income forecast method of depreciation, generally effective for
property placed in service after 9/13/96. Under this method, the
depreciation deduction is determined by multiplying the cost of the
property [minus salvage value] by a fraction, the numerator of which
is the income generated by the property during the year and the
denominator of which is the total estimated income to be derived from
the property during its useful life. The amendments are: (1) all
estimated income generated by the property [for the first 10 years]
must be taken into account in the computation; (2) the adjusted basis
amounts to be taken into account must satisfy the §461(h) economic
performance standard; and (3) taxpayers will be required to pay (or
would receive) interest based on the recalculation of depreciation
under a "look-back" method. Costs incurred after ten years with
respect to unproductive property are deductible. If property remains
productive after ten years, a new ten-year period begins.
9. District Court holds unassembled core reactor was
placed in service upon delivery. Northern States Power Co. v. United
States, 78 AFTR2d 5900, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11220 (D. Minn.
7/15/96). Nuclear reactor fuel assemblies, 121 of which comprise the
"reactor core," were "placed in service" upon receipt by taxpayer
because there were "ready and available" to be placed in a power plant
that had been operating for more than ten years. The court held the
operational equipment [the assemblies] to be entitled to ITC and
depreciation deductions "in the year acquired rather than in the year
that it is actually used." It did not matter that the installation and
testing process was complicated and time-consuming. The court
distinguished cases involving component parts of an uncompleted plant
or facility, such as Sealy Power, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 46 F.3d 382
(5th Cir. 1995), because there component parts of a power production
facility were held to be not "placed in service" until the entire
system reached a condition of readiness.
10. Cushion gas case in which Federal Circuit states why
it chooses to follow Fifth and Ninth Circuits. Washington Energy Co.
v. United States, 94 F.3d 1557, 96-2 U.S.T.C. 50,473 (Fed. Cir.
8/28/96) .Taxpayer was permitted to depreciate only that portion of
cushion gas in its underground reservoir that was not economically
recoverable, with the remainder treated as inventory. (Taxpayer
contended that the cushion gas was a unitary asset, and that salvage
value is to be disregarded in computing depreciation.) Judge Michel
noted that a decision in taxpayer's favor would have created a direct
conflict with the Fifth Circuit's decision in Arkla, Inc. v. United
States, 765 F.2d 487 (1985),and that "[a]s a general matter, we do not
create conflicts among the circuits without strong cause." He also
noted in footnote 6 that the Ninth Circuit, in which taxpayer was
located, had a rule similar to that of the Fifth Circuit. Query: Is
this a Federal Circuit Golsen rule? (See, Golsen v. Commissioner, 54
T.C. 742 (1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971).)
11. Texasgulf Inc. v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. No. 5
(9/9/96) .The Ontario Mining Tax is creditable under §901 because the
processing allowance in that tax meets the requirements of Reg.
§1.901-2(b) (4) (i) (B) in that -- based upon an expert study of OMT tax
returns that showed the aggregate amount of processing allowance was
three times the aggregate amount of nonrecoverable expenses -- the OMT
"permits the recovery of nonrecoverable expenses under a method that
is likely to produce an amount that approximates or is greater than
the amount of the nonrecoverable expenses." Judge Colvin held that the
regulations do not require that the processing allowance must be
intended to compensate for nonrecoverable expenses, nor do they
provide "that the processing allowance must bear a predictable
relationship to the nonrecoverable expenses."
B. Expenses
1. INDOPCO aftermath: "Deductions are exceptions to the
norm of capitalization." (Blackmun, J.).
a. TAM 9544001 (7/21/95). Costs related to the
adoption of a just-in-time manufacturing process were required to be
capitalized under §263, pursuant to INDOPCO.
b. *It didn't? Notice 96-7, 1996-6 I.R.B. 22
(1/19/96). Requests public comment [by 5/6/96] on approaches it should
use to address issues raised under §§162 and 263, particularly in
light of INDOPCO v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 92-1 U.S.T.C. 50,113
(1992). The Notice states, "The Service believes that the INDOPCO
decision did not change the fundamental legal principles for
determining whether a particular expenditure may be deducted or must
be capitalized."
c. Cleanup consulting fees deductible. TAM 9627002,
revoking TAM 9541005 (9/27/95), which denied a §162 deduction for
legal and consulting fees associated with an environmental cleanup.
TAM 9627002 followed Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35, to rule that all
the contested costs are currently deductible (1/19/96). The facts were
that the land was acquired in a clean condition by taxpayer's
predecessor, contaminated by the predecessor, donated to the county
for a park, and re-acquired by taxpayer's subsidiary for $1. The
ruling held that, because the same taxpayer contaminated the property
and incurred the costs, the interim break in ownership did not (of
itself) operate to disallow the deduction.
d. Black Hills Corp. v. Commissioner, 73 F.3d 799,
96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,036 (8th Cir. 1/10/96), aff'g 101 T.C. 173 (1993),
modified, 102 T.C. 505 (1994). Affirms finding that [under INDOPCO]
premiums for black lung liability insurance coverage produced
significant benefits that extended beyond the current tax years, and
therefore did not qualify as ordinary and necessary business expenses
under §162(a).
e. TAM 9618004 (1/23/96). Costs incurred in
performing major inspections of aircraft engines must be capitalized
because they materially increase the value of the engines and
substantially prolong their useful life. INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992), followed; Plainfield-Union Water Co.
v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333 (1962), nonacq., 1964-2 C.B. 8,
distinguished.
f. *Expenditures that produce substantial future
benefits must be capitalized, even if deductibility is otherwise
permissible. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Commissioner,
106 T.C. No. 27 (6/26/96). Taxpayer was required to capitalize, and
could not deduct under §162(a), its $20 million contribution to a
voluntary employees' benefit association (VEBA) trust to provide
holiday pay to its employees - an amount sufficient to cover holiday
pay for the next 8 to 10 years - because under INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992), capitalization is required when the
expenditure provides the taxpayer with significant benefits beyond the
year of expenditure. Taxpayer argued that its contribution should be
deductible because taxpayer's employees, rather than taxpayer, who
benefited; Judge Ruwe rejected this argument, stating that holiday pay
is closely akin to salary, the most basic obligation any employer
undertakes -- distinguishing two cases where the VEBA contribution
was for death, disability, severance and educational benefits [that
only incidentally benefited the employer]. (Note: This case involved
the 1985 tax year, which was not governed by the enactment in 1986 of
§§419 and 419A, which barred deductions in years subsequent to 1985 of
VEBA contributions that exceeded benefits.)
2. Oil and gas delay rentals must be capitalized under
§263A. TAM 9602002 (9/19/95). Delay rentals are not currently
deductible, but must be capitalized under §263A [including for years
prior to the final §263A regulations] as pre-production costs and
included in the depletable basis of the property for which they are
paid.
3. The new $74.99 dinner special. Notice 95-50, 1995-42
I.R.B. 8. Receipt threshold under the §274(d) disallowance [unless
substantiated] rule for travel, entertainment, etc. increased from $25
to $75 on 10/1/95.
4. Guy Schoenecker, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1995-539 (11/14/95). Reasonable compensation case, with difficulties
of proof. Compensation deductions in the range of $1 to $1.8 million
were reduced by 30 to 50 percent.
5. Does this holding apply to personal services
corporations? Donald Palmer Co. v. Commissioner, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,229
(5th Cir. 4/1/96) (per curiam), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1995-65. Affirms Tax
Court decision that only $220,700 [equal to half of the regular salary
paid] of an $818,500 bonus paid to plastic packaging corporation's
sole shareholder, president and only officer was deductible as
reasonable compensation. (The shareholder/employee generated
substantially all the corporation's sales; the corporation's only
other employees were a secretary, a bookkeeper, and a cleaning
person.)
6. *Is a full deduction available to the employer for a
cafeteria that provides only meals excludable under §119? Boyd Gaming
Corp. v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. No. 19 (5/22/96). On motion for
partial summary judgment, held that the cost of meals provided without
charge by gambling casinos to employees may be deducted in full
[without reduction under §274(n) (1)] if they are within the §132(e) de
minimis fringe benefit exception of §274 (n) (2) (B), and whether they
are within that exception is a question of fact. On the requirement
that the annual revenue from the eating facility normally equals or
exceeds the direct operating costs, Judge Laro noted that if §119
allows all the employees to exclude the value of the meals from gross
income, the eating facility's revenues and expenses will both be zero
for purposes of the test.
7. T.D. 8666, final regulations under §274, relating to
reimbursement and other expense allowance arrangements for business
meals and entertainment that are disallowed as a deduction under
§274(n), and working condition fringe benefit treatment for expenses
for club dues and spousal travel that are disallowed as a deduction
under §§274(a) (3) and 274 (m) (3) (61 F.R. 27005, 5/30/96).
B. Mulne v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-320 (7/15/96).
Section 280F did not apply by virtue of §280F(d) (3) (A) and a
telemarketing sales manager was allowed a §179 deduction for the cost
of a computer used exclusively for business purposes in her home
office. Even though [because the home office was not her principal
place of business] it did not qualify under §280A and thus the
exception to treating computers as listed property in §280F(d) (4) (B)
did not apply, the home office use of the computer was for the
convenience of the employer because the taxpayer had a heavy workload
but did not have access to her office in the employer's business
premises after normal business hours.
9. Fountain Valley Transit Mix, Inc. v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1996-244 (7/28/96). The Tax Court applied the "expense of
another" doctrine to disallow a lessee's deductions for maintenance of
leased property in a case in which the lease from a related lessor
provided that the lessor was to maintain the property. Although the
sole articulated ground for the decision was the expense of another
doctrine, it is questionable whether the same result would be
appropriate in a case in which the parties to the lease were not
related and there were no undercurrents of income shifting in the
case.
10. Hewett v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-110 (3/7/96).
The "portion" of the dwelling unit used "exclusively" for a purpose
exempted under §280A(c), does not need to be a separate room or to be
partitioned off from the remainder of a room that is used for personal
living. A piano teacher kept grand piano used exclusively for
teaching in an alcove off the living room was covered by the exception
in §280A(c) (1) and permitted to deduct an allocable portion of the
costs with respect to her home.
11. *Plan succeeds in avoiding §280A limits for rental
condominium. Razavi v. Commissioner, 74 F.3d 125, 96-1 U.S.T.C.
50,060 (6th Cir. 1/29/96). The taxpayer used his condominium unit for
27 days and leased it to the management company for the remainder of
the year for a percentage of guaranteed minimum of $21,000. The
management company rented the condominium to third parties for only
200 days and received $48,327. The court held that the taxpayer did
not use the condominium for more than 10 percent of the number of
rental days because the lease to management company was for the full
year minus personal use days and was a fair rental for that term. Thus
27 days was not more than 10 percent of rental days, which were all
335 remaining days of the year, not the 200 days for which the
management company rented out the unit. Note: Problems raised for the
§280A(g) exclusion of rental income [for residences rented out for
less than 15 days of the year] by the 17-day Atlanta Olympics.
12. Cunningham v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-141
(3/20/96). Section 280A(c) (5) applied to limit an S Corporation's
deductions with respect to building in which it conducted an art
gallery because the sole shareholder lived in second floor apartment
that was not separated from the first floor gallery by a permanent
partition but merely by doors in a common hallway; both floors of the
building were thus a dwelling unit.
13. *Rent paid to a related party must be reasonable.
Southern Boiler Sales & Service, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1996-13 (1/22/96), held that a deduction for rent paid to a related
party, the deduction is limited to "reasonable" rental payments, even
though §162(a) (3) does not expressly provide this limitation and with
out regard to §482 or any specific recharacterization of the nature of
the excessive amount. Alondra Indus., Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo
1996-32 (1/29/96) held that rental payments between related parties in
excess of a reasonable rent are not "required" and thus are not
deductible.
14. Home office deduction for storage of product samples.
SBT §1113 amends §280A(c) (2), which allows a home office deduction for
a space used as a storage unit for inventory of the taxpayer's
business of selling products at retail or wholesale (but only if the
home is the sole fixed location of such business), by adding "product
samples" to "inventory." Effective for years beginning after 12/31/95.
C. Losses and At Risk
1. Proposed regulations on §469(c) (7) relief for real
estate professionals. PS-80-93, proposed regulations under §469(c) (7)
[added by the 1993 Act], relating to rules for rental real estate
activities of real estate professionals (60 F.R. 2557, 1/10/95).
Interests in rental real estate (including limited partnership
interests) may be combined with one another into a single activity,
but may not generally be combined with other (i.e., non-rental) real
estate activities. The combined rental real estate activity remains
passive unless taxpayer materially participates in the rental
activity; and if there are limited partnership interest(s) in the
combined activity, taxpayer must meet the material participation test
for limited partnership activities under Temp. Reg. §1.469-5T.
a. Final S469(c) (7) regulations. T.D. 8645, 1996-8
I.R.B. 4 (12/21/95). Final regulations under §469(c) (7), providing
rules for rental real estate activities of taxpayers engaged in real
property trades or businesses, effective 1/1/95.
2. TAM 9543003 (7/10/95). Taxpayers did not materially
participate in a hotel condominium activity under Temp. Reg. §1.469-
5T(a) (3) even though they worked more than 100 hours during the
taxable year on their own condominium because at least one full-time
employee of the 53-unit activity, e.g., the desk clerk, performed more
hours of service for the entire hotel than did the taxpayers for their
own condominium.
3. Mordkin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-187
(4/17/96). Personal injury lawyer who spent no more than 135 hours
looking after his condominiums and serving as president of his
Snowmass condominium association failed to show that he materially
participated in the activity. The activity was not a §469(c) (2) rental
activity that was per se passive because the average period of
customer use was less than 7 days. Nevertheless, he did not materially
participate under the facts and circumstances test, despite arguably
satisfying the more than 100 hours of work test, because other persons
performed management services for compensation. Temp. Reg. §1.469-
5T(f) (4)'s requirement of 500 hours for material participation is not
invalid.
4. Schaefer v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 227 (9/13/95).
Taxpayer sold his Toyota dealership for slightly over $1 million (plus
inventory), and gave a [3-year, 5-mile] covenant not to compete in
exchange for about $10,000 per month for a 12-1/2 year period. He
contended that the covenant payments were passive activity gross
income, and that (former) Temp. Reg. §1.469-2T(c) (7) (iv) [which
provided the contrary] was invalid. Judge Raum held the regulation to
be valid, finding that the income was similar to earned income or
portfolio income, rejecting taxpayer's contention that the definition
of earned income in §911(d) (2) (A) [made applicable by §469(e) (3)] as
"compensation for personal services actually rendered" was
inapplicable to this income which did not involve the rendition of any
personal services. The court noted that, based upon authority, it was
at least arguable that the performance of a covenant does involve
negative services to be treated the same way as positive services, and
that a regulation was an appropriate way to resolve the question.
5. Smith v. Commissioner, 65 F.3d 37, 95-2 U.S.T.C.
50,517 (5th Cir. 9/25/95). Taxpayer's claim of short term capital
loss on the worthlessness of a nonbusiness bad debt [based upon his
guarantee of a $750,000 mortgage] was disallowed. Taxpayer claimed
that his purchase of the property at a bankruptcy sale (which also
served to eliminate a second lien of $367,000) was at a price of
$637,000 in excess of the property's fair market value of $235,000,
and that the transaction was so structured in order that taxpayer
could obtain mortgage financing of $750,000 towards the purchase. The
court held that no bad debt loss arose on a purchase, and that
taxpayer could not attack the form he used for the transaction.
6. Complementary goods and services received from casino
are includable in income, but (as "gains from [wagering]
transactions") may be offset by gambling losses. Libutti v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-108 (3/7/96). Taxpayer [gambler] could
deduct gambling losses under §165(d) to the extent of the
complimentary goods and services ("comps") he received from Trump
Plaza Casino in Atlantic City. (Losses and comps were, respectively,
in the following years: 1987 -- $4.1 million losses and $443,000
comps; 1988 -- $3.1 million losses and $975,000 comps; and 1989 --
$1.2 million losses and $1.1 million comps.) Judge Laro held that the
comps were "gains from [wagering] transactions" -- a term that is
broader than "gambling winnings" -- because they were increases in
wealth arising out of wagering transactions; this is a broader
interpretation of the income prong of §165(d) than other cases have
provided, but those cases were distinguished because they did not deal
with the specific facts here, i.e., a gambler who received comps to
induce him to gamble.
7. *Intergraph Corp. v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. No. 16
(5/8/96). Because the deduction for paying a loan guarantee is a §166
bad debt deduction, the guarantor of its Japanese subsidiary's debt
was not entitled to a bad debt deduction in the year of payment. The
subsidiary continued to operate as a going concern [albeit an
insolvent one] and the existence of subrogation rights gave guarantor
a right of recovery not shown to be worthless at the time. (Under Reg.
§1.166-9(a), it was not necessary for the subrogation rights to be
expressly stated in the guarantee agreement.)
8. Buchanan v. Commissioner, 87 F.3d 197, 96-2 U.S.T.C.
50,334 (7th Cir. 6/20/96). In an alternative holding disallowing a
claimed §166(c) nonbusiness bad debt deduction, the court held that
the unpaid balance of a partially collected nonbusiness bad debt
cannot be severed from the original debt and treated as a wholly
worthless bad debt. No §166(c) deduction was allowed. This
alternative holding was devoid of reasoning or citation to authority
and is contrary to- prior accepted case law. See Alexander v.
Commissioner, 26 T.C. 856 (1956) (acq.) (deduction allowed for $5,500
after only $500 of $6,000 nonbusiness debt was collected); Nash v.
Commissioner, 31 T.C. 569 (1958) (deduction allowed for unpaid balance
of nonbusiness bad debts that were partially repaid); Crown v.
Commissioner, 77 T.C. 582, 600, n.7 (1981) (acq. on other issues)
(applying this principle to reimbursement by co-guarantors to reduce
bad debt deduction of guarantor who satisfied debt).
9. Moore v. United States, 96-2 U.S.T.C. 150,413, 78
AFTR2d 5501 (E.D. Va. 6/6/96). A §165 loss by worthlessness deduction
might be available with respect to land if the taxpayer can establish
that by virtue of changed land use or environmental regulation a
"regulatory taking" under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
US 1003 (1992), has occurred. The deduction was denied because on the
facts a regulatory taking did not occur.
10. Schroeder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1.996-336
(7/24/96). Section 280B applied and no deduction was allowed for the
cost of demolition and debris removal of farm outbuildings no longer
used in the business.
11. PS-39-93, proposed regulations under §280B defining
the term "structure" for purposes of that provision denying deductions
for demolition losses (61 F.R. 31473, 6/20/96).
12. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States, 96-2 U.S.T.C.
50,420 (Fed. Cir. 8/2/96), aff'g in part, rev'g in part and remanding
32 Fed. Cl. 80 (Fed. Cl. 1994). Holds that the "single, identifiable
property" for purposes of determining casualty loss limits is (as
contended by taxpayer) the "depletion block" [the area into which
taxpayer aggregates it timber according to Reg. §1.611-3(c), such as
geographical boundaries], and not (as held by the Court of Federal
Claims) the smaller "tree stand" [an aggregation of trees sufficiently
homogeneous to be distinguishable from adjoining growth].
D. Business Income
1. Devaluation gains on foreign currency borrowings held
not to be cancellation of indebtedness income. Philip Morris Inc. v.
Commissioner, 104 T.C. 61 (1/23/95). Gains achieved in foreign
currency borrowing transactions solely by reason of the value of the
foreign currency decreasing between the date the borrowings were
incurred and the date of repayment did not constitute "discharge of
indebtedness" income that could be excluded under the former
§108 (a) (1) (C) qualified business indebtedness exception because the
foreign currency obligations were paid in full in the same currency
and "exchange gain arises as a result of a transaction separate from
the underlying transaction," distinguishing Kentucky & Indiana
Terminal RR v. United States, 330 F.2d 520, 64-1 U.S.T.C. 9374 (6th
Cir. 1964), and following United States v. Centennial Savings Bank
FSB, 499 U.S. 573 (1991) (As used in §108, the term "discharge . .
indebtedness" conveys forgiveness of, or release from an obligation to
repay.). Judge Tannenwald stated that the Centennial teaching was that
"the discharge of an indebtedness may be the occasion for the
realization of income but, unless there is a cancellation or
forgiveness of a portion of the indebtedness not reflected in the
terms of the indebtedness, such income is not [COD as required by
§108(a)]." He also noted that had the borrowed currency been held as
such taxpayer would have had a loss on its value exactly offsetting
the economic gain from repayment in the devalued currency. Note: This
case did not involve a year governed by §988 [added by the 1986 Act],
which would generally treat foreign currency gains as ordinary. Note
further that the §108(a) (1) (C) qualified business indebtedness
exception was repealed by the 1986 Act.
a. *Affirmed, reluctantly, 71 F.3d 1040, 96-1
U.S.T.C. 50,007 (2d Cir. 12/8/95). The court found that the facts in
this case were similar to those of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.,
284 U.S. 1 (1931), and felt that (unlike Centennial) this case
"appears to be just the type of situation that Congress sought to
ameliorate by 'establishing the tax-deferral mechanism in §108 so that
the prospect of immediate tax liability would not discourage
businesses from taking advantage of opportunities to repurchase or
liquidate their debts at less than face value,' " quoting Centennial.
The court concluded that it was "not at liberty" to decide for
taxpayer in light of the Centennial requirement that discharge of
indebtedness "requires a forgiveness or release of an obligation of
the underlying debt
2. *Taxpayer had income in year "loan" payments were made
to his partnership bcause any repayment of the loan was conditional
and contingent. Milenbach v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 184 (3/28/96).
Taxpayer was a limited partner of the Los Angeles Raiders during the
years 1980-82 (and the partnership's income was to be determined in
this consolidated proceeding for the years 1983-89). In 1982, in
connection with the negotiation of a lease agreement following the
Raiders' move from Oakland to Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum Commission agreed to lend the partnership $6.7 million at 10
percent interest, the loan to be paid with 12 percent of the net
receipts from luxury suites to be constructed by the Raiders at the LA
Coliseum. The suites were never constructed and the lender did not
seek repayment until after the Raiders signed a memorandum of
agreement with the City of Irwindale to move the team there; the
lender's lawsuit was settled in 1990 with the parties entering into a
mutual release. Judge Cohen held that there was never a valid debt
created because the partnership's obligation to repay the loan was
subject to its unlimited discretion and, therefore, conditional and
contingent. Held, income to the partnership in the years loan payments
were made.
III. CAPITAL GAIN AND LOSS
A. In general
1. Cramer v. Commissioner, 64 F.3d 1406, 95-2 U.S.T.C.
50,491 (9th Cir. 9/11/95). Taxpayers' attempted §83(b) [zero income]
elections with respect to options were invalid because the options did
not have a "readily ascertainable fair market value" and, under Reg.
§1.83-7(b) (2) provided that §83 did not apply to the transfer of an
option without a readily ascertainable fair market value." The
regulation is valid because it was "not plainly inconsistent with, nor
an unreasonable interpretation of, §83." Therefore, on the sale of the
options, the result is ordinary income, and not capital gain.
2. Webb v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-486 (10/10/95).
Follows Aizawa v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 197 (1992), aff'd, 74 AFTR2d
94-5493 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished), permitting taxpayer a loss on
the occasion of a foreclosure sale of property with a surviving
deficiency judgment against taxpayer [which was later discharged in
bankruptcy].
3. *A sad story from Arkansas. Hutcheson v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1996-127 (3/14/96). On 1/3/89, taxpayer telephoned his
Merrill Lynch broker (who was also his first cousin once removed,
i.e., his maternal grandfather's niece) and asked her to sell $100,000
worth of WalMart stock, but she sold 100,000 shares instead. (Taxpayer
had about 192,000 shares in his account, worth $6 million at $30 per
share; his basis in the stock was about 11 cents per share.) He
attempted to get Merrill Lynch to repurchase 96,600 shares in order to
effectuate a rescission of the erroneous sale, pursuant to Rev. Rul.
80-58, 1980-1 C.B. 181, but taxpayer himself repurchased the 96,600
shares at $44-1/2 per share on 12/28/89 [with Merrill Lynch waiving
commissions] and settled his arbitration claim against Merrill Lynch
for $250,000 in 1990. Taxpayer reported gain on only 3,400 shares, but
Judge Raum held that he had not rescinded the transaction, putting
buyers and seller back into "the relative positions that they would
have occupied had no contract been made," because the 1/3/89
purchasers of the 96,600 shares did not return the stock they received
from taxpayer on 12/28/89, and Merrill Lynch was merely taxpayer's
selling agent. Query: What would you do if one of your clients fell
into this situation? Could taxpayer have achieved a more satisfactory
practical result by acting more promptly?
4. Greene v. United States, 79 F.3d 1348, 96-1 U.S.T.C.
50,180 (2d Cir. 4/2/96). Taxpayer was required under §1256 to mark to
market regulated futures contracts (and, thus, recognize gain or loss
on the entire contract) at the time he donated the long-term gain
portion of each contract to his tax-exempt private foundation. The
court chose the particular provision [§1256] over the general
provision [§1001], and showed that abuse could occur when §1256 is
ignored and only the LTCG portion of 60% LTCG/40% STCG property is
donated.
5. Is Corn Products dead ... Pike v. United States, 88
F.3d 54, 96-2 U.S.T.C. 50,371 (1st Cir. 7/12/96). Summary judgment
for government affirmed on the ground that bank stock was not §1221(1)
inventory because claimed purpose of "purchasing enough [stock] in
certain banks . . . to persuade management to . . . [form a] holding
company" was not "a 'hedge' integral to protecting inventory or an
inventory-purchase system," as required by Arkansas Best Corp. v.
Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988). Losses incurred by an individual on
sales of stock of various banks that he purchased with the intent of
forming a bank holding company were capital losses. Under taxpayer's
theory, an investor in capital stock with a business motive could
recognize ordinary losses, but "Such an alluring door was firmly
locked in Arkansas Best."
6. Or is there still life in the old case ...
Computervision International Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-
131 (3/18/96). At the Commissioner's behest, the Tax Court appears to
have breathed new life into the Corn Products doctrine, although the
Computervision decision does not expressly refer to Corn Products.
Computervision received warrants to purchase stock in Sun Microsystems
as a price rebate on products purchased from Sun under a volume
purchase agreement. The warrants were exercisable only after
Computervision had purchased a specified amount of products from Sun.
The warrants became exercisable in January 1987, and were sold to an
underwriter on March 12, 1987. Computervision treated the fair market
value of the warrants on the date they became exercisable, $1,823,172,
as a reduction in the cost of goods sold for 1987, but reported the
excess of the amount realized over that $1,823,172 as capital gain.
Relying on Treas. Reg. §1.471-3(b), the Commissioner treated the
entire proceeds of the sale as a reduction in the cost of goods sold
during the year the warrants were sold, and the court upheld this
treatment without much analysis.
7. IA-26-94, proposed regulations under §1202, relating
to the 50-percent exclusion for gain for certain small business stock
(61 F.R. 28821, 6/6/96). Corporations would be allowed to redeem de
minimis amounts of stock without violating the §1202(c) (3) antievasion
rules, and that redemptions incident to certain events affecting a
shareholder would be disregarded in determining whether redemptions
exceed the de minimis amounts.
8. *Final debt modification regulations. T.D. 8675, final
regulations under §1001, relating to when a modification of a debt
instrument is treated as an exchange of the original instrument for a
modified instrument (61 F.R. 32926, 6/26/96).
9. *Foreign currency gain on U.K. residence could not be
offset by foreign currency loss on its mortgage. Quijano v. United
States, 93 F.3d 26, 96-2 U.S.T.C. 50,441 (1st Cir. 8/21/96). For
purposes of determining the gain on the sale of taxpayers' U.K.
residence, the exchange rate at the date of purchase ($1.49 to 1
pound) was to be used to calculate cost basis (in dollars) and the
exchange rate at date of sale ($1.82 to 1 pound, a decline in the
value of the dollar) was to be used to calculate the sale price. The
court held that the loss on the mortgage loan transaction [more
dollars needed to pay off the mortgage than taxpayer borrowed] could
not be used to offset the gain from the sale of the real estate [more
dollars received than paid], even though the currency loss on the
mortgage was mirrored by a currency gain on the house. Section 985(a)
requires that all income tax liability determinations are to be made
in the "taxpayer's functional currency," which is the U.S. dollar;
taxpayers' contention that this was a §988 hedging transaction (which
would result in integrated treatment) was rejected because they were
not in any business with respect to the house purchase and sale. Nor
did taxpayers have a qualified business unit (QBU), required by
§985(b) (1) for use of a functional currency other than the U.S.
dollar.
IV. CORPORATIONS
A. Entity and Formation
1. Debt-equity swap held to result in gain, not
contribution to capital. G.M. Trading Corp. v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.
59 (7/25/94), motion for reconsideration granted. Taxpayer
participated in a "Mexican debt-equity swap" transaction at the time
its Mexican subsidiary constructed a maquiladora plant for its
lambskin processing operations. Taxpayer purchased previously-issued
U.S. dollar denominated Mexican Government debt, which it exchanged
for Mexican pesos at an extremely favorable exchange rate, subject to
the restriction that the pesos could be used by taxpayer's Mexican
subsidiary only to construct its maquiladora plant. Taxpayer was taxed
on its gain of $410,000, computed as the excess of the value of the
pesos received ($1,044,000) over the amount paid for the debt
($634,000), based upon the court's determination that the restrictions
did not reduce taxpayer's subsidiary's economic benefit from the
pesos.
a. Tax Court adheres to its prior holding. G.M.
Trading Corp. v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. No. 13 (4/17/96), reaffirming
103 T.C. 59 (1994). The Mexican pesos received in the exchange were
not only for taxpayer's pledge to construct a plant in Mexico, but
also for the surrender of Mexican Government debt. The court held that
this surrender constitutes a quid pro quo that "taints what otherwise
might have qualified under §118 as a tax free contribution to
capital."
2. Proposed (and now final) regulations on disregarding
underwriters on transfers to corporations or partnerships in
connection with an offer of stock or partnership interests. CO-26-95,
proposed regulations under §§351 [§1.351-1(a) (3)] and 721, relating to
transfers of cash to a corporation (or partnership) in transactions
intended to qualify under those provisions when there is an offering
of stock or partnership interests through an underwriter (60 F.R.
40792, 8/10/95). Final regulations would make obsolete Rev. Rul. 78-
294, 1978-2 C.B. 141, which (in Situation 2) held that (in a "firm
commitment" underwriting) the underwriter was a transferor [along with
the individual owning the sole proprietorship], and that their control
was not defeated by the subsequent resale of 50 percent of the stock
in a public offering. The proposed regulation would disregard the
underwriter in a "qualified underwriting transaction," which is
defined as one in which either the underwriter is an agent of the
corporation or the underwriter's ownership of stock is transitory. (A
similar amendment would be made by adding Reg. §1.721-1(c) to the
partnership regulations.)
a. T.D. 8665, final regulations under §§351 and 721,
concerning transfers of cash to a corporation or partnership when
there is an offering of stock or partnership interests through an
underwriter (61 F.R. 19188, 5/1/96).
3. Peracchi v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-191
(4/22/96). Taxpayers' unsecured promissory note, contributed to their
wholly owned corporation, was not genuine indebtedness because it was
not intended to be enforced, so they were required to recognize gain
under §357(c) (1) measured by the excess of mortgage debt on the
property transferred over their adjusted basis in the property. Judge
Nims held that the question of whether a taxpayer's unsecured
promissory note could ever constitute "property" for §357(c) purposes
need not be addressed, refering to Lessinger v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d
519 (2d Cir. 1989), rev'g 85 T.C. 824 (1985).
4. T.D. 8663, final regulations under §351(e), relating
to transfers to investment companies (61 F.R. 19544, 5/2/96). The
final regulations amend the regulations to provide when certain
transfers will not cause a diversification of the transferors'
interests.
5. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Commissioner,
106 T.C. No. 21 (5/29/96). Transfer fees payable when a membership in
taxable membership corporation that operates a futures exchange are
excludable as §118 nontaxable contributions to capital -- and not
payments for services -- even though they are mandatory because they
were earmarked for reducing taxpayer's building indebtedness [a
capital expenditure], so the payors had an investment motive for
paying the transfer fees and an opportunity to profit from having made
the payments.
6. Tax-free customer contributions in aid of
constriction. The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 amended
§118 by adding new §118(c) providing that contributions in aid of
construction by customers of water and sewage disposal utilities are
not includable in income under §118(b).
7. The FASIT is created. The Small Business Job
Protection Act of 1996 §1621 added §§860H, 8601, 860J, 860K and 860L
to create a new type of statutory entity called a "financial asset
securitization investment trust" (FASIT), which may be used to
securitize debt obligations such as credit card receivables, home
equity loans and auto loans.
B. Distributions and Redemptions
1. CO-9-96, proposed regulations under §1059 [§1.1059(e)-
1] to clarify that the redemptions defined as extraordinary dividends
under §1059(e) (1) [non pro rata redemptions and partial liquidations
treated as dividends, both of which are so defined without regard to
threshold percentage or holding period of the stock] are not limited
by the exclusions of §1059(d)(6) [distributions to an original
shareholder out of e&p] or §1059(e) (2) [distributions from affiliated
corporation out of e&p accumulated during affiliation] (61 F.R. 30845,
6/18/96).
2. *Stock redemption expenses incurred to obtain a loan
are amortizable over the period of the loan. Small Business Tax Act
§1704(p) amended §162(k) retroactively to follow United States v. Kroy
(Europe) Ltd., 27 F.3d 367, 94-2 U.S.T.C. 50,316 (9th Cir. 1994)
(allowing amortization of fees incurred to obtain a loan to finance a
redemption), and to reject Fort Howard Corp v. Commissioner., 103 T.C.
345 (1994) (disallowing the deduction for investment banking fees
under similar circumstances). The amendment follows Judge Beghe's
dissent in Fort Howard, which was based on the principle that the
expenses were amortizable over the period of loans, the interest on
which is deductible under §162(k) (2) (A) (i). The amendment clarifies
that §162(k) applies to any acquisition of corporate stock made by
either the corporation itself or any 10 percent or more owner, whether
the reacquisition is treated as a sale or as a dividend, and
regardless of whether the transitions is a reorganization or other
transaction.
a. Fort Howard Corp. v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. No.
12 (10/22/96). Judge Ruwe held that the deductions for investment
banking fees were deductible in light of the retroactive amendment to
§162(k) in the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996.
C. S Corporations
1. Terminating election proposed regulations. PS-268-82,
proposed regulations, relating to the special rule of §1377(a) (2) that
permits a "terminating election" that applies §1377(a) (1) as if the
taxable year of the S corporation consisted of two taxable years, the
first of which ends on the date of the termination (60 F.R. 35882,
7/12/95). The election must be made by all shareholders upon a
terminating event, which occurs only if a shareholder's interest in
the S corporation is terminated. Note: In representing a terminating
shareholder, consider including in the sale contract a requirement
that this election be made.
a. Agreement to terminate year need not be made by
"all shareholders," but only by "all affected shareholders." See
amendments to S corporation provisions in the Small Business Job
Protection Act of 1996.
2. What happens when the IRS cannot locate the S
corporation election form? Carroll v. Commissioner, 71 F.3d 1228, 96-
1 U.S.T.C. 50,010 (6th Cir. 12/26/95). S corporation election form
timely mailed to the IRS was ineffective because the IRS has been
unable to locate the original form. Only the actual receipt rule --
and not the common law "mailbox rule" -- applies in the 6th and 2d
Circuits, except for the §7502 registered or certified mail prima
facie rule. The 8th and 9th Circuits do accept the common law mailbox
rule. Held: $22,500 deficiency. Moral?
3. S corporation provisions amended. SBT §§1301 through
1317 amend S corporation provisions as follows. These changes are
applicable to years beginning after 12/31/96 unless otherwise
provided.
a. *75 shareholders. SBT § 1301 amends §1361 to
increase the number of permitted shareholders from 35 to 75.
b. *Electing small business trusts are permitted
shareholders; spray and sprinkle trusts may now hold stock of S
corporations. There is, however a high price to be paid because the
trust is taxed at 39.6% on its S corporation income. SBT §1302 amends
§1361 to permit electing small business trusts to be shareholders.
All beneficiaries must be eligible individuals or estates, except that
charitable organizations may hold contingent remainder interests. No
interests in the trust may be acquired by purchase. Each potential
current beneficiary (i.e., any person who is entitled to, or may
receive at the discretion of any person, a distribution from trust
principal or income) is counted as a shareholder with respect to the
75 shareholder limitation. The trust is taxed at the highest
individual rate on all items of income, loss or deduction, as well as
on gain or loss from the sale of the S corporation stock -- but these
amounts are not included in DNI; in computing the trust's income, no
deduction is allowed for amounts distributed to beneficiaries.
c. *Expansion of post-death qualification for trusts
to be permitted shareholders. SBT §1303 amends §1361(c) (2) (ii) and
(iii) to extend from 60 days to 2 years the post-death holding period
that former grantor trusts and testamentary trusts are permitted to be
S corporation shareholders.
d. Financial institutions are permitted to hold safe
harbor debt. SBT §1304 amends §1361(c) (5) (B) (iii) to permit financial
institutions to hold safe harbor debt.
e. *IRS given more discretion to waive defects in
invalid elections and to validate late elections. SBT §1305 amends
§1362(f) to allow the Service discretion to waive the effect of an
invalid election (caused by inadvertent failure to qualify as an S
corporation or to obtain the required shareholder consents) and to
validate late elections as timely [retroactive for taxable years
beginning after 12/31/82].
f. *Agreement to terminate year need not be made by
"all shareholders," but only by "all affected shareholders." SBT §1306
amends §1377 to provide that elections to allocate items on a "closing
the books" basis may be made by "all affected shareholders" (instead
of "all shareholders"), but if a shareholder transferred shares to the
corporation, "affected shareholders" include all persons who were
shareholders during the year. Therefore, e.g., a 10 percent
shareholder who continues as such for the entire year need not join in
the election made when another shareholder terminates his interest by
sale, and, therefore may no longer exact a price for joining in the
election.
g. Post-termination transition period expanded and
special audit provisions for subchapter S items repealed (with
consistency rule substituted). SBT §1307(a) amends §1377 to expand the
post-termination transition period to include the 120-day period
beginning on the date of any determination pursuant to an audit that
follows the termination of the S corporation's election and adjusts a
subchapter S item of income, loss or deduction.
h. *TEFRA special audit provisions for S
corporations are repealed. SBT §1307(c) repeals the special audit
provisions for subchapter S items and adds new §6037(e), which
provides that a shareholder's return must be consistent with the
corporate return, or notify the Secretary of the inconsistency.
i. *S corporations may be members of an affiliated
group, and, therefore, will be permitted to hold subsidiaries. SBT
§1308 repeals §1361(b) (2) (A), which had defined as an "ineligible
corporation" any member of an affiliated group. This will permit S
corporations to hold both C-corporation and [100%] S-corporation
subsidiaries. A C corporation subsidiary will be permitted to join in
the filing of a consolidated return with any other affiliated C
corporations. Any S corporation whose stock is owned by another S
corporation must be a "qualified S corporation subsidiary" [wholly-
owned, and for which the parent S corporation makes an election],
which will be treated as being part of the parent S corporation -- and
not as a separate corporation.
j. Treatment of distributions during loss years. SBT
§1309 amends §1366 to modify the treatment of distributions during
loss years, by taking adjustments for distributions into account
before adjustments for losses.
k. Treatment of S corporations under subchapter C.
SBT §1310 amends §1371(a) (2) to provide that S corporations will be
generally treated "as corporations" (as opposed to "as individuals"
under prior law] for purposes of subchapter C. Therefore, S
corporations may liquidate their C corporation subsidiaries tax-free
under §§332 and 337.
1. Earnings and profits accumulated during S years
before 1983 are eliminated. SBT §1311 amends §§1362 and 1375 to
eliminate earnings and profits accumulated during S years prior to
1983.
m. Carryover of disallowed losses and deductions
under the at-risk rules. SBT §1312 amends §1366 to allow the carryover
of disallowed losses and deductions under the at-risk rules.
n. Adjustment of basis of inherited stock for items
of IRD. SBT §1313 amends §1367 to provide for the adjustment of basis
of inherited stock for items of IRD, effective for persons dying after
the date of enactment. This follows the rule for basis of inherited
partnership interests.
o. §1237 relief for subdivided real property
available to S corporations. SBT §1314 amends §1237 to make S
corporations eligible for rules applicable to real property subdivided
for sale by noncorporate taxpayers.
p. A bank makes an S election? SBT §1315 amends
§1361 to allow a (closely held) financial institution that is not
using the reserve method of accounting for bad debts to be an
"eligible small business corporation" and to make an S election.
q. *Qualified plan trusts and charities will become
eligible to be S shareholders. SBT §1316 amends §1361(b) (1) and (c) to
make organizations described in §401(a) [qualified retirement plan
trusts] and in §501(c) (3) [public charities and private foundations]
eligible to be S corporation shareholders (with (1) income, loss, etc.
flowing through from the S corporation, and (2) gain or loss on the
disposition of the S corporation stock, included in UBTI, per new
§512(e)). Applicable to years beginning after 12/31/97. Each tax-
exempt organization will be considered as one shareholder. Certain of
the tax rules applicable to ESOPs will not apply with respect to S
corporation stock held by the ESOP.
r. 5-year rule for reelecting subchapter S status is
waived. SBT §1317(b) waives the Code §1362(g) 5-year waiting period
for making a new S election for any corporation whose S election was
terminated under Code §1362(d) in a taxable year beginning before
1/1/97.
D. Affiliated Corporations
1. T.D. 8660, 61 F.R. 10447 (3/13/96). Final regulations
§1.1502-13(f) (6), disallowing losses incurred, and (in certain
circumstances) eliminating gains realized, by a member of a
consolidated group on stock of the group's common parent.
2. Rev. Proc. 95-39, 1995-35 I.R.B. 17. Procedure for
obtaining permission to discontinue filing consolidated returns;
application required to be filed on or before 6/30/96.
3. T.D. 8677, 1996-30 IRB 7 (61 FR 33321, 6/27/96). New
Temp. Reg. §1.1502-21T, regarding NOLs, replaces the separate return
limitation year (SRLY) loss rules for consolidated returns.
4. T.D. 8678, 1996-31 I.R.B. 11 (61 FR 33335, 6/27/96)
and T.D. 8679, 1996-31 I.R.B. 4 (61 FR 33313, 6/27/96). Temp. Reg. §§
1.1502-5T, 1.1502-90T through 1.1502-99T applying §382 with respect to
consolidated returns, replacing the consolidated return change of
ownership (CRCO) rules.
E. Section 482
1. T.D. 8656, (61 F.R. 4876, 2/9/96). Final and temporary
regulations under §6662, providing guidance under §6662(e) for net
§482 transfer price adjustments. The final regulations retain the
requirement that taxpayers who select and apply a specified method
must make a reasonable effort to determine the potential applicability
of other specified methods, but this need not involve a thorough
analysis under each such method. Taxpayers need use only data
available before the end of the tax year, and need not continue to
search for data thereafter; however, if taxpayer obtains data between
the end of the tax year and the date on which the tax return is filed,
this data must be included in its principal documents (to be provided
to the IRS on request). For service transactions, need not declare any
specified method on the tax return.
2. T.D. 8670, amendments to final regulations under §482
to repeal the "active conduct" rule of Reg. §1.482-7(c) for
participation in a cost sharing arrangement (61 F.R. 21955, 5/9/96).
F. Reorganizations and Corporate Divisions
1. Proposed regulations: Yoc Heating reversed; continuity
of interest exists. CO-62-94, proposed regulations §1.338-2(c) (3),
relating to whether the continuity of interest requirement is met when
target assets are transferred to the purchasing corporation (or
another member of the same affiliated group) following a qualified
stock purchase if a §338 election is not made (60 F.R. 9309, 2/17/95).
The proposed regulation would reverse Yoc Heating v. Commissioner, 61
T.C. 168 (1973), by establishing that §338 replaces any nonstatutory
treatment of a stock purchase as an asset purchase. Continuity of
interest treatment would be granted to the corporate 80+% purchaser
only, and not to minority shareholders.
a. Final regulations. T.D. 8626 (60 F.R. 54942,
10/26/95). Adopts proposed regulations, virtually unchanged, effective
10/26/95.
2. Rev. Rul. 95-69, 1995-42 I.R.B. 4. Satisfaction of the
Reg. §1.368-1(b) continuity of proprietary interest requirement is not
affected by a partnership's distribution of stock received in a
reorganization to its partners in accordance with their interests in
the partnership. The distribution was made in order that the surviving
corporation in a merger can qualify as a small business corporation
eligible to elect to be an S corporation.
3. Revised §355 checklist makes changes. Rev. Proc. 96-
30, 1996-19 I.R.B. (4/22/96). Guidance in the form of a revised
checklist questionnaire specifying the information and representations
that must be included in a request for a §355 ruling, changing the
representations previously required by Rev. Proc. 86-41, 1986-2 C.B.
716. The Procedure revokes §3.01(23) of Rev. Proc. 96-3 [which sets
forth "no rule" positions regarding certain corporate business
purposes] and contains an appendix that provides guidelines for ruling
requests involving certain corporate business purposes.
4. Rev. Rul. 96-29, 1996-24 I.R.B. 5 (5/22/96). A
reincorporation [in another state] transaction qualifies as an F
reorganization even though it was a step in a public
offering/redemption transaction (Situation 1) or in a transaction in
which another business was acquired (Situation 2). Rev. Rul. 79-250,
1979-2 C.B. 156, did not apply the step-transaction doctrine because
"the economic motivation supporting each transaction is sufficiently
meaningful on its own account, and is not dependent upon the other
transaction for its substantiation." The 1979 ruling was intended to
address the unique status of reorganizations under §368(a) (1) (F), and
was not intended to reflect the application of the step-transaction
doctrine in other contexts.
5. *Rev. Rul. 96-30, 1996-24 I.R.B. 4 (5/22/96),
modifying Rev. Rul. 75-406. A transaction taking the form of a §355
spin-off of the stock of a wholly-owned subsidiary, followed by the
acquisition of the assets of the former subsidiary in a merger, will
be respected for federal income tax purposes where there had been no
negotiations regarding the acquisition with the distributing
corporation and the former subsidiaries voted on the merger after the
distribution and were free to vote their stock for or against the
merger. Section 7805(b) relief will be considered by the Service on a
case-by-case basis.
6. Rev. Proc. 96-39, 1996-33 I.R.B. (7/23/96). The
Service will no longer issue advance rulings (pending further study)
under §355 if there have been negotiations, agreements or arrangements
which, if treated as consummated before the distribution, would result
in the distribution of stock or securities of a corporation not
controlled by the distributing corporation.
7. Rev. Proc. 96-43, 1996-35 I.R.B. (8/8/96). The Service
will ordinarily no longer issue advance rulings on whether a
distribution satisfies §355 when the gross assets of the trades or
businesses relied upon to satisfy the active trade or business
requirement of §355(b) have a fair market value that is less than 5
percent of the total fair market value of the gross assets of the
corporation directly conducting the trades or businesses. The Service
may rule favorably if it can be established that those trades or
businesses are not de minimis compared with the other assets or
activities of the corporation and its subsidiaries.
V. EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND PLANS
A. In General
1. In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128 (4th Cir. 10/23/95) (2-1).
Retired physician sued for $160 million for sexual misconduct with
patients would not be required to withdraw $1.4 million from his IRAs
for the benefit of the patients [who were his sole creditors] in a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
2. Plan disqualification for lack of a formality; Tax
Court no longer adheres to Baetens. Fazi v. Commissioner, 102 T.C.
695 (5/19/94) (reviewed, 14-0) ("Fazi I"). Taxpayer's [wholly-owned]
corporate dental practice had a prototype pension plan, which was
found to be unqualified at the time of a $1.1 million distribution to
taxpayer in 1987 because plan amendments required by the 1982 Act's
(TEFRA) top-heavy provisions and the 1984 DEFRA and REA provisions,
while made to the prototype plan, were not formally adopted by the
corporate plan through a so-called "joinder agreement" made between
the corporate plan and the insurance company trustee of the prototype
plan -- even though, in operation, the corporate plan complied with
the amended prototype plan.
a. The entire amount of the distribution was taxable
despite the taxpayer's attempted rollover to an individual retirement
account; the Tax Court will no longer follow its holding in Baetens
v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 152 (1984), rev'd, 777 F.2d 1160, 85-2
U.S.T.C. 9847 (6th Cir. 1985), that taxes only those portions of the
distribution which were accumulated while the trust was disqualified.
102 T.C. at 710-14. The Tax Court now agrees with the 5th, 6th and
7th Circuits, but not the 2d Circuit.
b. Fazi I clarified: amount merged from qualified
plan to disqualified plan not taxable until distributed. Fazi v.
Commissioner, 105 T.C. No. 29 (12/19/95), clarifying 102 T.C. No. 31
(1994). Plan 2 [a profit sharing plan that was frozen in 1982) was in
1986 merged into Plan 1 [a money purchase plan, which was held to be
unqualified for years 1985, 1986 and 1987 for the corporation's
failure to adopt formally a plan complying with TEFRA, DEFRA and REA
changes]. In Fazi I, the Commissioner conceded that the taxable
distribution made in 1987 should not include 1985 and 1986
contributions because these would be taxable in the years that
contributions were made to an unqualified trust, and included in 1986
contributions the amount in Plan 2 (merged into Plan 1). Judge Vasquez
held that the merged amount was not taxable in 1986 because the merger
of an exempt trust into a nonexempt trust was not a contribution by
the employer. The court refused to apply the doctrine of "judicial
estoppel" against taxpayers because the court was not misled or
whipsawed by taxpayers, but "any loss to the revenue has been the
direct result of [Commissioner's] erroneous concession in Fazi I." The
court held that, because the amount in Plan 2 was not includable in
income in 1986, there was insufficient omitted income in 1986 for the
six-year statute of limitations to apply.
3. *IRS makes up its mind on FICA/FUTA taxes on
nonqualified deferred compensation. EE-142-87, 61 F.R. 2194, and EE-
55-95, 61 F.R. 2214 (1/25/96). Proposed regulations under §§3121(v) (2)
and 3306(r), relating to when amounts deferred under nonqualified
plans are taken into account as "wages" for purposes of FICA and FUTA
purposes. In interpreting the statutory provision that wages are taken
into account as of the later of: (1) when the services are performed,
or (2) when there is no significant risk of forfeiture of the rights
to such amounts, the proposed regulations state that where it is
difficult to determine the present value of a benefit - e.g., where a
benefit can fluctuate depending on the varying amount of a qualified
plan benefit - the present value of the benefit need not be included
in wages until it becomes "reasonably ascertainable."
4. *Inclusion of "domestic partners" does not disqualify
health plan, but does result in inclusion of cost of partner's
coverage in employee's income. Ltr. Rul. 9603011 (10/18/95). Inclusion
of "domestic partners" in a health plan does not disqualify the plan
for the §106 exclusion [of amounts contributed by employer for health
insurance benefits of employees, their spouses and dependents], but it
will result in inclusion in the employee's income of the excess of the
fair market value of domestic partner coverage over the amount paid
for such coverage unless the domestic partner (1) is recognized as a
spouse under state law or (2) is qualified as a dependent under §152.
5. IRS rules that single premium collateral assignment
split-dollar life insurance generates income to employee. TAM 9604001
(9/8/95). Collateral assignment split-dollar life insurance
arrangement [policy owned by employee's trust, with assignment to
employer as security for employer's loan (of the premium)], for single
premium policy results in the inclusion in employee's income of (a) an
amount equal to the one-year term cost of declining life insurance and
(b) any cash surrender buildup in the policy that exceeds the amount
returnable to employer when the arrangement is discontinued.
6. *Supreme Court opens a litigation window for
individuals. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065 (U.S. 3/19/96) (6-
3). Beneficiaries of a firm's welfare benefit plan [retiree medical]
were permitted under ERISA §§404 and 502(a) (3) to be reinstated in
their employer's welfare benefit plan, after they were tricked into
withdrawing [and transferring to an underfunded subsidiary] by their
employer, who was the plan's administrator. The Court (by Justice
Breyer) held that (1) the employer was acting in its capacity as an
ERISA fiduciary when it significantly and deliberately misled the
beneficiaries, (2) the employer violated the fiduciary obligations
that ERISA §404 imposes upon plan administrators, and (3) ERISA
§502(a) (3) authorizes lawsuits seeking relief for individual
beneficiaries harmed by an administrator's breach of fiduciary
obligations. Dissent by Justice Thomas on the ground that recovery was
only authorized under ERISA §§409 and 502(a) (2) by "the plan as an
entity," and not by individual plan participants.
7. Rev. Proc. 96-29, 1996-16 I.R.B. 24. Changes the
definition of when a plan is ineligible for the VCR Program and the
Walk-in Closing Agreement Program, to conform the definition to that
set forth in Rev. Proc. 95-24, 1995-1 C.B. 694, which describes the
Tax Sheltered Annuity Voluntary Correction Program.
8. Announcement 96-26, 1996-17 I.R.B. 13. Provides
information relating to refunds of the §4972 excise tax for
nondeductible contributions that were retroactively exempted from the
tax by the Retirement Protection Act of 1994.
9. Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 8664
(5th Cir. 4/17/96) (2-1). Judge Wisdom's majority opinion held that
the anti-alienation provision of ERISA did not preempt Louisiana
community property law, so employee's widow's survivor's annuity -- to
the extent it represented the community property interest belonging to
employee's first wife (who died during his employment, leaving 2/3 of
her estate to the employee [her husband] in a lifetime usufruct) --
was subject to a possible accounting and award of some portion of the
retirement benefits to the three sons of the first wife as owners of
the naked or reversionary interest in the portion of her estate over
which employee held a usufruct. Judge King dissented on the ground
that the widow's rights under ERISA -- which were to have been applied
uniformly nationwide -- were not only "tenuously, remotely or
peripherally" affected by Louisiana law, but rather, "They have been
gutted." The dissent would have followed Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d
1450 (9th Cir. 1991). and DOL Advisory Opinion #90-46A (12/4/90) on
this issue.
10. Dwyer v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. No. 18 (5/15/96).
Severe depression did not constitute a disability under §72(m) (7)
[which provided that an individual is to be considered disabled "if he
is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason on
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment"], so the 10
percent tax under §72(t) on premature distributions from an IRA was
applied. Judge Nims held that taxpayer's losing $94,000 as a stock
trader in 1989 was not inconsistent with "gainfulactivity."
11. Gallade v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. No. 20 (5/28/96).
Taxpayer executed a "waiver" of his fully vested, accrued benefits in
favor of his wholly owned corporation on the termination of the
pension plan operated by the corporation [in which he participated]
because of the corporation's poor financial condition. Held, ERISA's
anti-alienation provisions prohibited the assignment of taxpayer's
benefits to the corporation, and taxpayer received a taxable
distribution because he had an unconditional right to receive the
benefits and contributed them to the corporation. Judge Gerber further
held that the Commissioner abused her discretion by failing to waive
the substantial understatement penalty.
12. Early retirement benefits may be conditioned upon
waiver of claims against the employer. Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 116 S.
Ct. 1783 (U.S. 6/10/96). ERISA does not prevent an employer from
conditioning the receipt of early retirement benefits upon plan
participants' waiver of employment claims because plan sponsors
[Lockheed and its directors] were not acting as fiduciaries when they
amended the plan to impose the waiver of employment claims as a
condition of receiving early retirement benefits. Justice Thomas'
majority opinion further held that the 1986 Act's repeal of ERISA's
age-based exclusion provision did not require that previously excluded
employees -- Spink was 61 when reemployed by Lockheed in 1979 --
receive credit for their pre-1988 [effective date of 1986 repeal]
service years.
13. Lear Eye Clinic, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. No. 23
(6/10/96), on remand from Citrus Valley Estates, Inc. v. Commissioner,
49 F.3d 1410, 95-1 U.S.T.C. 50,132 (9th Cir. 1995), aff'g in part and
remanding in part 99 T.C. 379 (1992). Decided whether the plan
participants properly counted their previous employment towards the
§415(b) maximum benefit limitations.
14. Held not to be a QDRO. Was it because divorce court
refused to modify its order over wife's objection? Hawkins v.
Commissioner, 102 T.C. 61 (1/27/94). On the distribution of $1
million from husband's dental practice pension plan to wife pursuant
to New Mexico domestic relations court order upon their divorce,
husband was taxed because the order did not clearly create or
recognize wife's rights as an alternate payee to plan benefits (as is
required by §4 14(p)), but merely stated that wife was to receive $1
million "from Husband's share of the ... plan." But, reversed
a. *Tenth Circuit holds it was a QDRO based upon
construction of its language. Hawkins v. Commissioner, 96-1 U.S.T.C.
50,316 (10th Cir. 6/14/96), revIg 102 T.C. 61 (1994). On construing
the words contained in the marital dissolution decree, "Wife shall
receive as her separate property . . . $1,000,000 from Husband's share
[of the pension plan]," the Tenth Circuit held those words sufficient
to "create, recognize or assign to her the right to receive benefits
under the plan" for qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) purposes
because neither an expressed intent to reallocate the tax burden of a
pension distribution nor the words "alternate payee" are required by
§414(p) (1) (A) (i). The court further held the language, "Husband shall
immediately allow Wife to take possession of the property transferred
[to her] by this Agreement," was sufficiently precise to meet the
§414(p)(2) requirement that it "clearly specify certain facts."
Therefore, wife was taxed on the plan distribution.
15. Eyler v. Commissioner, 88 F.3d 445, 96-2 U.S.T.C.
T50,353 (7th Cir. 7/2/96). Taxpayer was subject to the §4975
prohibited transaction excise tax because he failed to meet the burden
of establishing that his sale of employer-issued securities to his
corporation's ESOP was for adequate consideration because the $14.50
price paid by the ESOP was not a fair market value. That figure was
mentioned by Prudential-Bache as a price for an initial public
offering that did not occur, including changes from the time the
prospectus was filed by the underwriters as well as a discount for
lack of marketability.
16. Pension simplification provisions. SBT §§1401-1461
consist of "pension simplification provisions."
a. Simplified distribution rules. SBT §1401-1404,
the "simplified distribution rules":
b. 5-year averaging repealed. Repeal 5-year
averaging for lump-sum distributions from qualified plans, effective
for years beginning after 12/31/98;
c. Exclusion for employer-provided death benefit
under §101(b) is repealed. Repeal the §101(b) $5,000 exclusion for
employer-provided death benefits, effective with respect to decedents
dying after the date of enactment;
d. Simplified method for basis recovery. Provide a
simplified method for basis recovery on payments from qualified plans,
effective with respect to annuity starting dates beginning 90 days
after the date of enactment; and
e. Employed geriatrics (over 70-1/2), other than 5
percent owners, need not commence receiving distributions from
qualified plans until they retire. Modify the rule that requires all
participants in qualified plans to commence receiving distributions by
age 70-1/2, in that for employees (other than 5 percent owners)
distributions are not required to begin until the employee retires
(with an actuarial adjustment to increase the benefit to take into
account the period after age 70-1/2 in which the employee was not
receiving benefits). (The actuarial adjustment rule does not apply to
defined contribution plans.) Effective for years beginning after
12/31/96, with provisions for the optional cessation of distributions
for current recipients.
17. Increased access to retirement savings plans. SBT
§§1421-1427, the "increased access to retirement savings plans"
provisions:
a. SIMPLE retirement plans. Establish SIMPLE
retirement plans for employees of small employers in IRA form,
effective for years beginning after 12/31/96. Eligible if 100 or fewer
employees with $5,000 of compensation in preceding year and do not
maintain another qualified plan; employee before-tax contributions
limited to $6,000 (indexed). Employer must either match employee
contributions at 100 percent up to 3 percent (may lower to 1 percent
in 2 out of 5 years with advance notice) or non-matching employer
contribution of 2 percent for each employee with $5,000 or more
compensation. May be either an IRA or part of a 401(k) plan. Effective
for tax years beginning after 12/31/96;
b. Tax-exempts may maintain 401(k) plans. Permit
tax-exempt organizations (except state and local governments to
maintain 401(k) plans, effective for plan years beginning after
12/31/96; and
c. Spousal IRA contribution limit increased from
$250 to $2,000. Increases the maximum deductible spousal IRA
contribution from $250 $2,000, effective for taxable years beginning
after 12/31/96.
18. Nondiscrimination provisions. SBT §§1431-1434, the
"nondiscrimination" provisions:
a. Highly compensated definition modified, with
election to include/exclude recipients of more than $80,000 annual
compensation but are not in the top 20 percent of employees. Modify
the definition of "highly compensated" from prior law's (i) 5 percent
owners, (ii) recipients of more than $100,000 annual compensation,
(iii) recipients of more than $66,000 annual compensation and in the
top 20 percent of employees in compensation, (iv) any officer who
received annual compensation in excess of $60,000, and (v) the highest
paid officer, to (i) 5 percent owners, and (ii) recipients of more
than $80,000 annual compensation (who are within/not within the top 20
percent of employees in compensation, based upon an annual election).
Therefore, an employer can elect to treat employees with more than
$80,000 in annual compensation [but not in the top 20 percent] as
either highly compensated or not highly compensated on a year-by-year
basis. This election would be of interest to employers [such as law
firms] who have more than 20 percent of employees who are paid more
than $80,000 per year.
(1) Repeals the family aggregation rules with
respect to relatives of 5 percent owners for purposes of the $150,000
limit on compensation that may be taken into account under a qualified
plan. Effective for years beginning after 12/31/96.
b. Minimum participation rule for SLOBs. Modify the
§401(a) (26) minimum participation rule [must benefit the lesser of (1)
50 employees, or (2) the greater of 40 percent of all employees or 2
employees] to provide that it applies only to defined benefit pension
plans. The requirement that a line of business has at least 50
employees will no longer apply for the separate line of business
(SLOB) determination. Effective for years beginning after 12/31/96.
c. May use prior year data for nondiscrimination
testing. Modify the special nondiscrimination tests applicable to
401(k) plans by providing that prior year data -- instead of current
year data -- is to be used [with a special rule for the first plan
year], effective for years beginning after 12/31/96.
(1) They provide two safe harbor tests to
satisfy those special nondiscrimination tests. The first safe harbor
is that the plan satisfies a notice requirement and either (1)
satisfies a "matching contribution" requirement or (2) the employer
contributes at least 3 percent of compensation for each nonhighly
compensated eligible employee without regard to whether the employee
makes elective contributions. There is also a second safe harbor.
Effective for years beginning after 12/31/98.
(2) There is a new rule with respect to the
distribution of excess contributions (and excess aggregate
contributions), effective for years beginning after 12/31/96.
d. Treats elective deferrals to 401(k) plans, etc.,
as compensation for purposes of the $150,000 limit. Provides that
elective deferrals to §401(k) plans and similar arrangements, elective
contributions to nonqualified deferred compensation plans of tax-
exempt employers and State and local governments [§457 plans], and
salary reduction contributions to a cafeteria plan are treated as
compensation for purposes of the limits on contributions and benefits,
effective for years beginning after 12/31/97.
19. Miscellaneous provisions. SBT §§1441-1461, the
"miscellaneous" provisions include:
a. SBT §1441 amends §401(d) to eliminate the special
aggregation rules that apply to plans maintained by owner employees of
unincorporated businesses that do not apply to other qualified plans,
effective for years beginning after 12/31/96.
b. SBT §1442 conforms the vesting rules for
multiemployer plans to the rules applicable to other qualified plans,
with varying effective dates.
c. SBT §1445 provides for the gradually-increasing
§415 social security retirement age to be the uniform retirement age
for determining whether subsidized early retirement benefits and joint
and survivor annuities violate the §401(a) (4) general
nondiscrimination rules, effective for years beginning after 12/31/96.
d. SBT §1449 corrects the GATT interest and
mortality rate provisions in the Retirement Protection Act of 1994,
effective as if included in that Act.
e. SBT §1450 permits participants in §403(b) tax-
sheltered annuity plans to enter into more than one salary reduction
agreement in a taxable year [effective for taxable years beginning
after 12/31/96-5), and provides that the $9,500 annual limit on
elective deferrals for §403(b) plans be applied to each tax-sheltered
annuity contract -- as opposed to the annual limit applying to the
plan under current law -- effective for years beginning after
12/31/95, with 90 days after enactment for compliance. No inference is
intended as to whether the exclusion of elective deferrals from gross
income by employees who have not exceeded the annual limit is affected
to the extent other employees have exceeded the annual limit prior to
years beginning in 1996
f. Permits waiver of minimum 30-day waiting period
when explanation is provided after the annuity starting date. SBT
§1451 codifies the provision in Temporary Regulations to provide that
a participant may elect (with any applicable spousal consent) to waive
the minimum 30-day waiting period for distributions following the date
the explanation was provided, as long as the distribution begins more
than 7 days after the explanation was provided. It also permits that
the explanation may be provided after the annuity starting date, to
allow retroactive payments of benefits. Effective with respect to plan
years beginning after 12/31/96.
g. §415(e) combined plan limit repealed. SBT §1452
repeals the §415(e) combined plan limit [the lesser of 1.25 times the
$90,000 maximum benefit and 1.4 times the high 3 years' average
compensation] where a single employee has both a defined benefit plan
and a defined contribution plan, effective with respect to limitation
years beginning after 12/31/99. Meanwhile, the §4980A excise tax on
excess distributions is suspended for distributions received in 1997,
1998 and 1999.
h. Initial level §4975(a) tax on prohibited
transactions is increased from 5 percent to 10 percent. SBT §1453
increases the initial level §4975(a) tax on prohibited transactions
from 5 percent to 10 percent, effective for transactions occurring
after the date of enactment.
i. New test for leased employees. SBT §1454 replaces
the §414(n) test for a "leased employee" as one who performs services
of a type "historically performed" by employees in the recipient's
business field with a test under which an individual is not considered
a leased employee unless the individual's services are performed under
the primary direction or control of the service recipient, effective
for years beginning after 12/31/96 (with exception for relationships
that have been previously determined by IRS ruling not to involve
leased employees).
j. Treasury must provide sample language that is
also "simple language" for spousal consents and QDROs. SBT §1457
requires Treasury to provide sample language [that is also simple
language] for inclusion in a spousal consent form and in a qualified
domestic relations order, the sample language to be developed no later
than 1/1/97.
k. SBT §1459 provides alternative nondiscrimination
rules for 401(k) plans that provide for early participation, effective
for plan years beginning after 12/31/98.
1. Date for making plan amendments extended through
the end of 1997. SBT §1465 extends the date for making plan amendments
required by the pension simplification provisions of this Act, by
providing that the amendments are not required to be made before the
first plan year beginning on or after 1/1/98 (1/1/00 for governmental
plans).
20. Interest exclusion on loans to ESOPs repealed. SBT
§1602 repeals the §133 50-percent interest exclusion on loans to ESOPs
used to acquire employer securities, effective for loans made after
the day of enactment with grandfather provision for written binding
agreements in effect before 6/10/96.
21. Medical Savings Accounts for a limited number of
taxpayers. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
("HIPAA") [see XIV, below for full citation] §301 adds new §220 to
provide for medical savings accounts for a 4-year pilot period 1997-
2000, for up to 750,000 participants on a first-come/first-served
basis. for a limited number of taxpayers. These accounts are created
with employer-provided, or individual, deductible contributions (up to
a maximum of 65 percent of the deductible in the case of individual
coverage, or 75 percent in the case of family coverage] and are
established in connection with a small employer's high deductible
health plan [a deductible between $1,500 and $2,250 for individual
coverage, and between $3,000 and $4,500 for family coverage] or by a
similarly-insured self-employed individual. Distributions for medical
expenses are excludable from income; distributions not for medical
expenses are includible in income, and are subject to an additional
15-percent tax unless made after age 65, death or disability.
22. Self-employed health insurance deduction increases
from 30 percent to 80 percent. HIPAA §311 amends §162(1) to increase
the self-employed health insurance deductibility percentage from 30
percent to 40 percent in 1997; to 45 percent in 1998 through 2002; to
50 percent in 2003; to 60 percent in 2004; to 70 percent in 2005; to
80 percent in 2006 and thereafter.
23. More ways to avoid the 10 percent additional tax on
distributions. HIPAA §361 amends §72(t) to exclude from the 10 percent
additional tax those distributions made from IRAs which are used to
pay financially devastating medical expenses (including health
insurance for the individual and dependents for unemployed
individuals). Effective for taxable years beginning after 12/31/96.
24. Abraham v. Exxon Corp., 85 F.3d 1126, 78 AFTR2d 196-
5324 (5th Cir. 6/10/96). On summary judgment, held that leased
employees [who "report to Exxon supervisors, have Exxon business cards
and play on the Exxon softball team] are not entitled to pension plan
benefits even though Exxon conceded for purposes of its motion that
the plaintiffs were "common law employees" of Exxon. The court refused
to follow Renda v. Adam Meldrum & Anderson Co., 806 F. Supp. 1071
(W.D. N.Y. 1992) (holding that ERISA §1052 (a) (1) (A) forbids employers
to discriminate against leased employees when designing an ERISA
plan), because ERISA §1052(a) does not prevent employers from denying
participation in an ERISA plan if the employer does so on a basis
other than age or length of service.
25. Rev. Rul. 96-47, 1996-40 I.R.B. (9/16/96). Pension
plan that automatically invests the funds of its ex-employees in the
money market fund is a "significant detriment" imposed by the plan on
a participant who does not consent to a distribution, and therefore
fails to satisfy the §411(a) (11) consent requirements.
26. REG-245562-26, proposed amendments to Reg.
§1.401(a) (31)-i, providing guidance on the qualification of retirement
plans that accept rollover contributions from employees (61 F.R.
49279). Acceptance of rollover contributions, in appropriate
circumstances [e.g., where the plan administrator reasonably concludes
that a distribution meets the other requirements to be an eligible
rollover distribution, or is a rollover contribution from an employee
within 60 days from the date of distribution from a plan, or is a
rollover contribution from a conduit IRS], will not affect a plan's
qualification.
VI. EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND CHARITABLE GIVING
1. "Royalty" payments not UBIT. . . Sierra Club, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 103 T.C. 307 (8/24/94). Consideration received by tax-
exempt organization on account of mailing list rentals and its
participation in an "affinity card" program was royalty income, and
not UBIT, following Disabled American Veterans v. Commissioner, 94
T.C. 60 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 942 F.2d 309, 91-2 U.S.T.C.
50,336 (6th Cir. 1991).
a. *Sierra Club affirmed on mailing list rental
issue, but remanded on "affinity card" program income issue. Sierra
Club Inc. v. Commissioner, 86 F.3d 1526, 96-1 U.S.T.C. T50,326 (9th
Cir. 6/20/96). Royalties received from mailing list rentals were not
UBTI because, although the court interpreted the §512(b) (2) exclusion
of "royalties" as limited to royalties received as compensation for
the use of property, the Sierra Club received these payments for use
of its mailing lists, and not for services performed. On the issue of
income from the organization's affinity credit card program, remanded
for factual findings, including a determination as to whether
endorsement services were required from the organization [in addition
to licensing its name and logo and permitting the use of its mailing
lists].
b. Fifth Circuit holds that payments are not
royalties. Texas Farm Bureau v. United States, 53 F.3d 120, 95-1
U.S.T.C. 50,297 (5th Cir. 6/1/95), reversing the district court.
Payments to a §501(c) (5) tax-exempt agricultural association from
partially-owned life and casualty insurance companies constituted
unrelated business taxable income, and not royalty payments (as a
matter of law) because the agreements under which the payments were
received stated that the association would furnish "influence and
prestige," as well as administrative and clerical services.
c. Oregon State University Alumni Ass'n Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-34 (1/30/96). Income from affinity
credit card program is royalty income, not UBIT.
2. Rev. Proc. 95-21, 1995-1 C.B. 686 (3/23/95). The
Service will not treat dues payments from associate [usually, but not
necessarily, non-voting] members of §501(c) (6) [labor and
agricultural organizations] as unrelated business taxable income
unless the associate member category has been formed or availed of for
the [organization's] principal purpose of producing unrelated business
income.
a. National League of Postmasters of the United
States v. Commissioner, 86 F.3d 59, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,317 (4th Cir.
6/14/96). Dues received from "Limited Benefit Members" for the sole
benefit of participation in organization's health insurance plan were
unrelated business taxable income (UBTI) because the provision of
health benefits [and some other miscellaneous benefits of no real use]
to persons who are not members in any other sense cannot be
substantially related to the organization's tax-exempt purpose.
3. Lucky Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. No. 28
(12/19/95). Retail grocery corporation allowed to base its deduction
on the full retail price of 4-day-old bread donated to charities [soup
kitchens and homeless shelters] because it regularly sells 4-day-old
bread in its stores without price discount. (Section 170(e) (3) allows
a deduction in the amount of the basis plus one-half of unrealized
appreciation -- but not more than twice the basis -- for certain
inventory items donated to qualified charities.) The court refused to
accept a valuation based upon the industry practice of selling 3-day-
old bread at a 50% discount on discount racks or in thrift stores.
Rev. Rul. 85-8, 1985-1 C.B. 59 (holding that products donated shortly
before the products' expiration date had to be reduced to take the
impending expiration into account in determining value for §170(e) (3)
purposes), distinguished on the ground that the expiration date for
bread was not legally required.
4. Florida Hospital Trust Fund v. Commissioner, 71 F.3d
808, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,023 (1/2/96), aff'g 103 T.C. 140 (1994). Trust
funds organized to provide a vehicle for member hospitals reciprocally
to "self" insure each other on a group basis against liability and
workers' compensation claims do not qualify as §501(e) tax-exempt
"cooperative hospital service organizations" because they are not
engaged in purchasing insurance on a group basis as contemplated under
§501 (e) (1) (A).
5. TAM 9609007 (12/6/95). Section 501(c) (3) public
charity's fund raising letters violated prohibition against
intervention in a political campaign (and were political expenditures
for purposes of the §4955(d) (1) excise tax). Charity contended that
the politically oriented statements served only to give a sense of
urgency to fund raising appeals, there being no motivation to
intervene in political campaigns. This argument was rejected, based
upon Rev. Rul. 76-456, 1976-2 C.B. 151, and Association of the Bar of
the City of New York v. Commissioner, 858 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1988).
a. IR-96-23 (4/24/96) . Reminder to charities that
they may not engage in political campaign activities.
6. Taxable organization may spin off an exempt portion.
Bob Jones University Museum & Gallery, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1996-247 (5/29/96). Petitioner corporation that took over the
operations of an art museum on the campus of a "university whose tax
exemption was revoked [461 U.S. 574 (1983)]" nevertheless qualified
for exemption under §501(c)(3) where a majority of its five directors
were not affiliated with the university because the university does
not derive an impermissible benefit from the museum's operation.
Neither the payment of [below-market] rent to the university nor the
enhancement of the university's reputation constituted such a benefit.
Judge Foley stated that a museum was not an essential part of a
university and that he would have concern if a cafeteria or bookstore
spun-off from a taxable corporation sought exempt status. He further
held that there was no rule that taxable corporations may not have
financial dealings with spun-off tax-exempt organizations.
7. IRS leaves prepaid tuition plans without guidance.
Rev. Proc. 96-34, 1996-26 I.R.B. 14. The IRS will not rule on whether
prepaid tuition plans are state entities [and, if not, how they are
treated for federal tax purposes], and whether any contract under the
plan is a debt instrument [and, if so, how interest or OID
attributable to the contract is treated for federal tax purposes].
a. *But Congress legislates favorably; tax treatment
of State tuition programs is blessed by new legislation. SBT §1806
adds new §529 to provide that "qualified State tuition programs" are
exempt from taxation (except for §511 UBIT), following Michigan v.
United States, 40 F.3d 817 (6th Cir. 1994) . These state-established
programs permit a contributor to make cash contributions to provide
for future payment of a designated beneficiary's "qualified higher
education expenses," i.e., tuition, fees, books and equipment required
for attendance at a college, university or area vocational education
school (as defined in §135(c) (3)). Amounts distributed are includible
in the gross income of the distributee (i.e., the beneficiary where
benefits are furnished to him or her under the plan) under the §72
annuity provisions. The value of any interest in a qualified program
is includible in the contributor's gross estate. The waiver (or
payment to an educational institution) of qualified educational
expenses is treated as eligible for the §2503(e) exclusion from
treatment as a transfer of property by gift. Effective for tax years
ending after 8/20/96.
8. Penalty on amounts of private excess benefits.
Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 ("T2") [see XIV., below, for full citation]
§1311 adds new §4958 to provide for intermediate sanctions short of
disqualification for "excess benefit transactions." There is a 25
percent excise tax on the person receiving the benefit and a 10
percent excise tax on the organization's manager, with an additional
200 percent excise tax if the excess benefit is not corrected. An
excise benefit transaction includes, but is not limited to, the
payment of unreasonably high compensation to a person in a position to
influence the organization. Applies to §501(c)(3) charitable
organizations other than private foundations [already covered], as
well as to §501(c)(4) social welfare organizations. Effective to
inurement occurring on or after 9/14/95, with a grandfather through
the end of 1996 for written contracts binding on that date and at all
times thereafter.
9. Full deduction for contributions of appreciated stock
to private foundations is extended for 11 months. SBT §1206 extends
the special rule in §170(e) (5) to allow a full fair market value
deduction for contributions of qualified appreciated stock made to
private foundations to the 11-month period 7/1/96 through 5/31/97.
10. American Academy of Family Physicians v. United
States, 91 F.3d 1155, 96-2 U.S.T.C. 50,414 (8th Cir. 8/6/96). Section
501(c) (6) physicians' organization did not have income subject to the
§511 unrelated business income tax from sponsorship of group insurance
plans because the organization did not have the profit motive required
for a trade or business and its involvement in the insurance plans was
not extensive. The organization lent its endorsement and sold its
mailing lists for fair market value, but did not market or administer
the insurance policies.
VII. INTEREST
A. In General
1. Interest on Schedule C income tax underpayments.
a. *Interest on Schedule C income tax underpayments
is per se nondeductible personal interest. Miller v. United States, 65
F.3d 687, 95-2 U.S.T.C. 50,485 (8th Cir. 9/5/95), aff'g 95-1 U.S.T.C.
50,068 (D. N.D. 8/1/94). The district court had denied a business
expense deduction with respect to interest incurred on an income tax
deficiency because the deficiency was not properly attributable to
taxpayer's [farming] trade or business, but the court held that Temp.
Reg. §1.163-9T(b) (2) (i) (A) was invalid to the extent it provided that
interest on an underpayment of noncorporate income tax was per se
nondeductible personal interest. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, but
based its opinion on the validity of the regulation as a "permissible
construction" of §163(h) (2) (A) under an "implicit legislative
delegation of authority to the Commissioner to clarify whether income
tax deficiency interest [is properly allocable to a trade or
business]," finding the regulation to be consistent with the 1986
statutory provision, with its legislative history [and Bluebook], and
with the 1988 amendment of the definition of "personal interest" [that
expressed no dissatisfaction with the regulatory rule that interest on
income tax deficiencies constituted personal interest per se].
b. *Interest on federal income tax deficiencies
arising from Schedule C errors was properly allocable to business
indebtedness; Temp. Reg. §I.163-9T(b) (2) (i) (A) -- providing that
personal interest includes interest paid on underpayments of
individual federal income taxes -- was held to be invalid as it was
here applied. Redlark v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. No. 2 (1/11/96)
(reviewed, 11-7). The 1986 Act provision for nondeductibility of
personal interest [§163(h)] did not make any substantive change in
earlier case law [e.g., Standing v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 789 (1957),
aff'd, 259 F.2d 450, 58-2 U.S.T.C. 9835 (4th Cir. 1958)] holding that
interest on a federal income tax deficiency resulting in part from
improper reporting of income from a sole proprietorship was deductible
as a business expense. Therefore, Temp. Reg. §1.163-9T(b) (2) (i) (A),
which provided that interest on deficiencies in individual federal
income tax is nondeductible personal interest, is invalid as applied
to interest on a deficiency arising from a Schedule C adjustment.
Dissents on the ground that the regulation is a reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Compare, Professional
Equities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 165 (1987) (reviewed, 16-0),
acq. 1988-2 C.B. 1 (wraparound mortgage regulation promulgated
subsequent to the Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980 is invalid
because it attempts to revise prior case law without express statutory
authorization).
2. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Commissioner,
105 T.C. 341 (11/6/95) . Undercapitalized Netherlands Antilles finance
subsidiary used for Eurodollar borrowings was recognized as a separate
entity, and not merely as a conduit.
3. *Payments made to defer closing of stock purchase
agreement held to be interest. Halle v. Commissioner, 83 F.3d 649, 96-
1 U.S.T.C. 50,250 (4th Cir. 5/6/96) (2-1), rev'g and remanding T.C.
Memo. 1994-630. The majority held that partnership [in which taxpayer
was a partner] may deduct as interest $900,000 in payments [four
months at $225,000 per month] it made to defer the closing date of a
stock purchase agreement that obligated it to buy all of a
corporation's stock for $29 million. The partnership was formed by a
real estate developer, and the target corporation's sole asset was a
tract of land which the developer believed was suitable for
development. The stock purchase contract had a liquidated damages
provision that limited damages in the event of the partnership's
default to the $3 million downpayment and "any monthly installments
already paid to defer the settlement date" as "liquidated damages."
The majority held that the economic substance of the stock purchase
agreement imposed indebtedness upon the partnership -- although the
monthly payments were not characterized as interest -- because the
amount of liquidated damages was greater than any actual damages the
selling stockholders would have suffered. The majority distinguished
this case from Midkiff v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 724 (1991), aff'd sub
nom Noguchi v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1993), where
taxpayers did not have indebtedness until the transaction closed
because they would have sacrificed only a nominal amount [1.2% of the
settlement price] had they defaulted. Dissent on the ground of the Tax
Court's decision, that the $900,000 in settlement deferment payments
resembled amounts paid to retain the "option to complete or not
complete the transaction," and the sellers retained the risk that the
fair market value of the stock (and the land) would rise or fall; the
dissent stated that the price for the risk was 13 percent of the
purchase price, which was a reasonable amount to pay for an option.
Query: How did the seller report the $900,000 in payments?
4. Greenberg v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-281
(6/19/96). Payments received by Ponzi scheme "investors" constitute a
return of capital, and not "interest" as labeled by the schemer's
trustee in bankruptcy on Forms 1099-INT, because the payments were not
for "the use or forbearance of money," but were made to conceal the
schemer's fraudulent misappropriation of taxpayers' money.
5. Contingent payment debt regulations proposed. FI-59-
91, proposed amendments of Reg. §1.1275-4, relating to the tax
treatment of contingent payment debt instruments (59 F.R. 64884,
12/16/94). Provides separate rules for debt instruments issued for
cash or publicly traded property and for debt instruments that are
issued for nonpublicly traded property.
a. . . . and made final. T.D. 8674, final
regulations under §1275, relating to the tax treatment of debt
instruments that provide for one or more contingent payments (61 F.R.
30133, 6/14/96) . These regulations provide specifically that they do
not apply to state-sponsored prepaid tuition plans.
6. Bye-bye to leveraged company-wide COLI. HIPAA §501
amends §264 to deny the deduction for interest on loans with respect
to company-owned life insurance. Exception for key person insurance.
Phased-in effective dates and interest rates.
7. Davison v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. No. 4 (8/26/96).
Cash basis farm properties partnership [owned equally by three Peat,
Marwick partners] was not entitled to interest deduction where the
funds used to satisfy the interest obligation were borrowed for that
purpose from the same lender to whom the interest obligation was owed.
Although the partnership claimed to have had "unrestricted control" of
the borrowed funds, Judge Ruwe held that unrestricted control in any
meaningful sense was not possible because use of the borrowed funds
for any purpose other than paying interest would have resulted in
default on the underlying loan and the partnership going out of
business. There was no %payment" of interest, but merely a
postponement of the interest payment. Battelstein v. IRS, 631 F.2d
1182 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), and Wilkerson v. Commissioner, 655
F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1981), followed.
8. Notice 96-51, 1996-42 I.R.B. (9/25/96). Describes how
the inflation-indexed debt instruments that are expected to be issued
by Treasury will be treated in proposed and temporary regulations
under §§1275(d) and 1286. One of two methods, the coupon bond method
or the discount bond method, will apply to account for qualified
stated interest and the OID that accrues on the debt instrument based
on changes in the principal amount of the debt instrument and constant
yield principles.
VIII. NONTAXABLE EXCHANGES
A. Section 1031
1. Wittig v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-461 (9/27/95),
opinion withdrawn 11/5/95. No offsetting of boot received with new
mortgages placed on the acquired property in a §1031 exchange; boot
recognition required. However, the taxpayer's lawyer's service as
intermediary did not disqualify the exchange.
2. Christensen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-254
(6/3/96). If an attempted like-kind exchange fails to qualify under
§1031 (a) (3) because the taxpayer did not receive the new property
until after the required date, e.g., due date of his return for the
year of the exchange, the exchange will be treated as an installment
sale and §453 reporting will be available if the transaction otherwise
qualifies.
3. Paullus v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-419
(9/17/96).Judge Gerber held that a country club was not a dealer in
real property, so its exchange of the so-called unit 10 property
qualified for §1031 treatment because it was not held for sale in the
ordinary course of its real estate trade or business [because it was
held for a relatively long period of time (4 years) and was acquired
for investment purposes], although the court found it "troublesome"
that the country club maintained a sales office and had a list of
persons interested in buying lots.
B. Section 1033
1. Rev. Rul. 96-32, 1996-25 I.R.B. 5. If the dwelling
portion of taxpayer's principal residence is destroyed and the
remaining land portion is sold within the §1033 period, the sale is
treated as part of the involuntary conversion of the principal
residence to which §1033 may apply to defer gain recognition. Mortgage
interest payments will continue to qualify for §163(h) treatment for a
reasonable period pending either (1) the sale of the land or (2) the
reconstruction [reoccupation] of the destroyed dwelling.
2. *Presidentially declared disasters -- which seemed to
have occured weekly in 1996 -- will now allow a broad range for
investment of insurance proceeds received for the destruction of
investment or business property. SBT §1119 amends §1033(h) to expand
the special rule for property damaged in Presidentially declared
disasters by extending the provisions now applicable to personal
residences, [i.e., increased replacement period (from 2 years to 4
years), treatment of insurance proceeds as a common fund and expansion
of the definition of "similar property"] to apply to all "property
held for productive use in a trade or business or for investment."
Effective upon enactment.
3. §1033 basis adjustment rules. SBT §1610 modifies the
basis adjustment rules under §1033 involuntary conversion deferral
with respect to stock used as replacement property. Applicable to
taxable years beginning after 12/31/95.
C. Section 1034
1. How does §1034 applying when breaking up is hard to
do? Perry v. Commissioner, 91 F.3d 1996, 96-2 U.S.T.C. 50,405 (9th
Cir. 7/31/96) (sale of residence four years after taxpayer moved out
to reside with soon-to-be new wife). The taxpayer vacated the marital
abode as a result of divorce but retained an ownership interest while
his or her former spouse resided. He lived with his new wife for four
years prior to his former wife's abandonment of the original marital
abode and its sale. He was held to have abandoned the former home as a
principal residence, because the facts did not indicate that the
taxpayer ever intended to return to his original abode, and thus
denied §1034 treatment upon the sale of the home.
a. Judge Hall held "that once a taxpayer leaves his
marital home, permanently and with no intention to return, pursuant to
a divorce settlement which gives the other spouse exclusive occupancy
and which does not mandate that the house immediately be sold, the
taxpayer cannot avail himself of the nonrecognition provision in
§1034(a) with respect to that property [because that property is not
taxpayer's principal residence]." The exception where sale of the
house was prevented by forces beyond taxpayer's control was
inapplicable.
2. Bowers v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-333 (7/24/96).
Taxpayer moved out of the family home in October 1987, following his
divorce. The divorce decree awarded the right of occupancy to his
former wife, who vacated the home in July, 1989. From October 1987
until he purchased a new residence in January, 1989, taxpayer resided
in a number of locations with his new wife. Taxpayer was not entitled
to §1034 rollover upon sale of prior residence in December 1989
because it was not his principal residence at any time after October
1989.
D. Section 1041
1. Kochansky v. Commissioner, 96-2 U.S.T.C. 950,431 (9th
Cir. 8/13/96). Affirms Tax Court determination that the entire amount
of a contingent fee earned by taxpayer/lawyer is taxable to him,
despite the fact that a portion of the contingent fee was to be
distributed to his former wife pursuant to a divorce settlement. This
was an assignment of income subject to the rule of Lucas v. Earl, 281
U.S. 111 (1930), under which income is taxable to the person who earns
it, where only the right to receive the income was transferred to
taxpayer's former wife. It was not an "uncertain, doubtful and
contingent" claim, such as the claim for disputed overages transferred
by a construction subcontractor to a successor corporation, which [in
Jones v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1962)], was held taxable
to the transferee corporation, and not to the subcontractor. However,
the imposition of the negligence penalty was reversed because language
in the Jones case may have led the taxpayer to believe the assignment
was valid for income tax purposes.
IX. PARTNERSHIPS
A. Partnership Audit Rules
B. Miscellaneous
1. Check the box? Notice 95-14, 1995-1 C.B. 297
(3/29/95). IRS is considering amending the classification regulations
to allow taxpayers to treat domestic unincorporated business
organizations as partnerships or as associations on an elective basis,
and is considering similar rules for foreign business organizations.
a. *Check the box proposed regulations are finally
out, and they were worth waiting for. PS-43-95, proposed regulations
under §7701 that would implement the check-the-box entity
classification proposal announced in Notice 95-14, 1995-1 C.B. 297
(5/9/96). Elective rules being provided for unincorporated
organizations (including organizations that have a single owner),
which may be treated as (1) associations or (2) partnerships (or
"nothing", i.e., a sole proprietorship or a branch). The default in
the absence of an affirmative election is "partnership or nothing"
treatment, which is usually desired. Foreign organizations are to be
similarly treated, except that certain listed foreign limited
liability entities would always be classified as corporations.
2. Using controlled partnerships instead of controlled
foreign corporations enables avoidance of subpart F taxes on foreign
base company income. Brown Group Inc. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 616
(4/12/94). Under pre-1986 Act law, taxpayer's wholly-owned subsidiary
[controlled foreign corporation) does not have (foreign base company)
subpart F income by reason of its distributive share of income from a
Brazilian partnership [which the CFC controls by virtue of 88%
ownership] that acts as purchasing agent for taxpayer with respect to
footwear manufactured in Brazil because §954(d) (3) did not then define
a partnership owned by a CFC as a "related person" and, more
significantly, the entity theory of partnership taxation applies so
the determination of whether the CFC's share of the partnership's
income is subpart F income is to be made at the partnership level. The
court held that subpart F income is defined "in the case of any
controlled foreign corporation," and that partnerships could not ever
have subpart F income. The government contended that, under the
aggregate theory of partnership taxation, the existence of the
partnership should be ignored and the CFC should be treated as if it
had engaged in the partnership's activities. Note: Opinion withdrawn.
a. Tax Court vacates earlier decision, but splits
evenly on aggregate-entity issue. Brown Group, Inc. v. Commissioner,
104 T.C. 105 (1/25/95) (reviewed, 9-3), on reconsideration of 102 T.C.
616 (1994). Affiliated group's share of foreign partnership's income
was subpart F income; the aggregate theory of partnership should apply
because that theory furthers the purposes of subpart F. Judge Halpern
discusses the aggregate and entity theories of partnership. The three
concurring judges would use the literal terms of §954 to reach the
same result, disagreeing with the majority's *aggregate-entity
conclusion.
b. Eighth Circuit reverses Tax Court and finds for
taxpayer. Brown Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 F.3d 217, 96-1
U.S.T.C. 50,055 (8th Cir. 1/25/96, as corrected 2/6/96), rev'g 104
T.C. 105 (1995). Tax Court erred in ignoring the partnership entity
[foreign partnership 88 percent owned by Panamanian subsidiary CFC of
which taxpayer was the sole U.S. shareholder] in characterizing
earnings attributable to the partnership's purchase of shoes in Brazil
and resale to taxpayer as subpart F income because subpart F income
(as here pertinent) requires sales between "related persons" and pre-
1986 Act §954(d) (3) did not include in the definition of "related
person" a partnership controlled by a CFC. The court held the anti-
abuse regulation §1.701-2 to be inapplicable to transactions occurring
before its 1994 effective dates (5/12/94 for §1.701-2 [in general] and
12/29/94 for §1.701-2(e) [IRS can treat a partnership as an
aggregation of its partners]).The court did have dictum in footnotes
that indicated it agreed with the Tax Court dissent, which noted
agreement with the entity theory of partnerships and disagreement with
the aggregate theory.
c. Notice 96-39, 1996-32 I.R.B. (8/5/96). The
Service will issue regulations under Subpart F (§951 et. seq.)
describing how the aggregate approach to partnerships applies to
determine the treatment of a controlled foreign corporation's
distributive share of partnership income. The Service also announced
that it disagreed with the decision in Brown Group, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 77 F.3d 217, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,055 (8th Cir. 1/25/96),
because to permit a CFC to avoid subpart F by earning income through a
partnership would be contrary to the purposes of subpart F.
3. Rev. Proc. 96-12, 1996-3 I.R.B. 30 (12/18/95).
Effective 1/16/96, the IRS will no longer issue rulings as to whether
-- in connection with the transfer of a life insurance policy to an
unincorporated organization -- (1) the organization will be treated as
a partnership, or (2) the transfer will be exempt from the §101
transfer for value rules, when substantially all of the organization's
assets consist of life insurance policies on the lives of the members.
4. T.D. 8642, 1996-7 I.R.B. 4 (12/22/95). Final
regulations under §§704 (c) (1) (B) and 737, relating to the recognition
of gain or loss on certain distributions of contributed property by a
partnership and to the recognition of gain on certain distributions to
a contributing partner.
5. PS-2-95, proposed regulations under §731(c), relating
to the treatment of a distribution of marketable securities [as money,
for purposes of §§731(a) (1) and 737] by a partnership (61 F.R. 28,
12/29/95).
6. *Rev. Rul. 96-10, 1996-4 I.R.B. 26 (1/4/96). With
respect to disallowed losses under §707(b) (1) on sales of partnership
property to a related partnership, the basis of each partner's
interest is decreased (but not below zero) under §705(a) (2) by the
partner's share of that loss. With respect to gain not recognized
[under §§707(b) (1) and 267(d)] upon resale of the property at a gain
by the related partnership, the basis of each partner's interest is
increased under §705(a) (1) by the partner's share of that gain.
7. *Rev. Rul. 96-11, 1996-4 I.R.B. 28 (1/4/96). If a
partnership makes a charitable contribution of unencumbered property
[which is not subject to the §170(e) (1) limitations], the basis of
each partner's interest is decreased (but not below zero) by the
partner's share of the partnership's basis in the property
contributed. This is because the contribution is not taken into
account in computing the partnership's taxable income, so it results
in a permanent decrease in the aggregate basis of its assets without
any further tax effect; therefore, a basis reduction is necessary to
avoid discontinuity between the inside and outside bases of the
partnership.
8. TAM 9619002 (1/31/96). When a bankruptcy court
discharges a partner from his share of a partnership recourse debt,
the partner's tax consequences are determined under §§731 and 752;
they are not determined under §§61(a) (12) and 108(a) because the
partnership did not have any income from debt discharge that would be
passed on to the partner under §702. Therefore, the partner has §1001
gain -- not discharge of indebtedness income.
9. Proposed regulations (PS-5-96) under §708(b) (1) (B),
relating to the termination of a partnership on the sale or exchange
of 50 percent or more of the total interest in partnership capital or
profits (61 F.R. 21985, 5/13/96). The proposed regulations would
change the current rule that the partnership is deemed to have
distributed its property to the purchaser and the remaining partners,
who are deemed immediately thereafter to have contributed the
properties to a new partnership. The rule under the proposed
regulations would be that a termination under §708(b) (1) (B) would no
longer result in a deemed distribution of the terminated partnership's
assets, but, instead, the partnership would be deemed to have
transferred all of its assets and liabilities to a new partnership
with the terminated partnership distributing interests in the new
partnership to the purchasing partner and the other remaining partners
in liquidation of the terminated partnership. Therefore, the federal
income tax consequences of a deemed distribution of assets would no
longer occur, including the possibility of §731(a) gain, a change of
partnership's basis in property, and the commencement of a new five-
year period for purposes of §§704(c)(1)(B) and 737.
X. PERSONAL AND INDIVIDUAL INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A. Miscellaneous Deductions and Credits
1. Payments made under §6672 are nondeductible §162(f)
penalties. Duncan v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 315, 95-2 U.S.T.C. 50,547
(9th Cir. 10/12/95). Taxpayer could not deduct amounts he paid under
§6672 with respect to his corporations' unpaid federal withholding
taxes as §166(d) nonbusiness bad debts. The Tax Court had held that
the payments were penalties and not deductible, regardless of whether
they might otherwise qualify as bad debts, because allowing such
deductions "would only encourage the wrongful refusal to pay over
taxes withheld pursuant to federal law," following Tank Truck Rentals,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). The Ninth Circuit affirmed,
rejecting taxpayer arguments that: (1) IRS Policy Statement P-5-60
provides that §6672 penalties "will be used only as a collection
device" and that the obligation would be collected only once [because
that is only administrative largesse and §6672 creates a penalty
separate from the corporations' underlying tax obligations], and (2)
United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268 (1978), held the §6672 liability
to be a "tax" for bankruptcy purposes [but not dischargeable under the
bankruptcy laws for the same policy reason the payments are not
deductible under the tax laws]. The court allowed payments made to
satisfy state (Oregon) employment tax liability to be deducted,
because Oregon law placed liability on the responsible person from the
outset [by defining him as an "employer"] and the obligation is,
therefore, not a "penalty."
2. Westbrook v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 868, 95-2 U.S.T.C.
50,587 (5th Cir. 10/30/95), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1993-634. Affirms Tax
Court holding of hobby farm losses disallowed and substantial
understatement penalty imposed.
3. *Legal fees paid in settling breach of employment
contract dispute do not offset the taxable award, but are only allowed
as a miscellaneous itemized deduction, subject to the §67 floor.
Alexander v. IRS, 72 F.3d 938, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,011 (1st Cir.
12/22/95). Legal fees paid in settling employment contract dispute
were deductible only as a §67 miscellaneous itemized deduction, and
not as an offset to the settlement proceeds [or, as taxpayer
characterized it, an expenditure properly charged to the capital
account of taxpayer's "valuable intangible assets" under §§1001 and
1016]. Therefore, as a miscellaneous itemized deduction, the legal fee
is not deductible for AMT purposes. (Settlement was $250,000 for
contract damages and $100,000 for age discrimination, out of which
attorneys fees allocable 95 percent [$245,100] to contract damages and
5 percent to discrimination damages were paid; the allocation was
based upon taxpayer's lawyers' time records.)
4. The bride may have been radiant, but the beaming groom
could not carry her over the threshold because they had no home. Baugh
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-70 (2/21/96). Nuclear plant radiation
protection technicians who worked at various nuclear plants during
shutdowns could not exclude (or deduct under the §162(a) (2) away from
home provision) per diem/travel amounts. Held: taxpayers were
itinerant workers who did not have a home "from which to be away"
because they did not incur additional and duplicate living expenses.
5. Beatty v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 268 (4/17/96).
Taxpayer was a county sheriff, who was paid a salary of $30,566. He
was required to provide meals to all prisoners in the county jail and
received per diem per prisoner meal allowances of $109,952; if he was
able to provide meals for less than the per diem, he was permitted to
keep the difference. The taxpayer reported that he provided the meals
as an independent contractor and reported the meal allowances and the
cost of the prisoner's meals on Schedule C, but the Commissioner
argued that the meal allowances were additional compensation and the
cost of the prisoners' meals was an employee business expense,
deductible only after taking into account all of the limitation, and
not deductible at all in computing alternative minimum tax. Held: It
was irrelevant whether the sheriff provided the meals as an
independent contractor or as an employee because the cost of the
prisoner's meals was a cost of goods sold, not a §162 expenses, and
thus was not subject to any of the limitations governing employee
business expenses. Only the profit from providing the meals was
included in taxpayer's gross income.
6. Keller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1996-300 (6/27/96).
Section 274(m) (2) barred a college professor from deducting the costs
of a sabbatical in Spain where he wrote a play about the European
perspective on the Gulf War because his purpose while in Spain was to
learn about the European perspective, which was squarely within
Congress' intent in enacting §274(m) (2) barring deductions for travel
as a form of education.
7. Looby v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-207 (4/30/96).
Legal fees incurred by a residuary legatee of an estate to seek
removal of the executor for self dealing, charging excessive fees, and
mismanagement of the estate were not deductible. The expenses were
incurred to increase the size of the inherited estate and were either
personal or capital.
8. Long-term care provisions. HIPAA §321 adds §7702B to
treat long-term care insurance as accident and health insurance and
HIPAA §322 amends §213(d) to treat qualified long-term care services
as medical care (applicable to benefits paid after 12/31/96).
HIPAA§323 adds §6050Q to require an information return to be filed by
the payor of benefits.
9. New adoption credit and exclusion. SBT §1807 adds new
§23 (credit for qualified adoption expenses up to $5,000, $6,000 if
adopt a special needs child) and adds new §137 (excluding from gross
income employer-provided adoption assistance), effective for taxable
years beginning after 12/31/96.
10. Earned income tax credit provisions tightened. Welfare
Reform Act [see XIV., below, for full citation] §910 amends the §32
earned income tax credit by (1)denying the earned income credit to
individuals not authorized to be employed in the United States [i.e.,
those without valid taxpayer identification numbers]; (2) changing the
disqualified income test and (3) modifying the definition of adjusted
gross income used for phasing out the credit. Generally effective for
tax years beginning after 12/31/95.
11. Jasko v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. No. 3 (8/20/96). Legal
fees incurred in obtaining recovery of insurance proceeds after
taxpayers' principal residence was destroyed by fire were not
deductible under §212 as amounts expended for the production of
income, but -- under the origin of claim doctrine -- the legal fees
%%represent capital expenditures nondeductible under section 263 and an
offset against the gain represented by the insurance proceeds, none of
which [taxpayers] recognized in the taxable year before [the court]."
12. Espinosa v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. No. 9 (9/24/96).
Nonresident alien's deductions were disallowed under §874(a) because
he failed to file timely returns, although he suffered net losses from
his rental properties in the U.S. and his late-filed returns contained
§871(d) elections.
B. Miscellaneous Income
1. Discrimination, etc. damages
a. Supreme Court holds that age discrimination
damages are not excludable under §104 (a) (2); Court redefines
eligibility for exclusion, holding that statute requires a personal
injury [in addition to a "tort"]. Commissioner v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct.
2159, 95-1 U.S.T.C. S50,309 (U.S. 6/14/95) (6-3). Neither part of age
discrimination recovery is excludable from gross income. Back wages
were not "on account of" any personal injury because airline pilot's
turning 60 is not a personal injury, nor is being fired for turning 60
a personal injury. Therefore, the recovery of back wages is
independent of any personal injury. The liquidated damages portion
(payable only for "willful" violations) was intended by Congress to be
"punitive in nature." The reference in Reg. §1.104-1(c) to "tort or
tort type rights" does not eliminate the statutory requirement of
"received . . . on account of personal injuries or sickness," but is
an additional requirement. The Court noted that United States v.
Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 92-1 U.S.T.C. 50,254 (1992), merely dealt with
the sex discrimination claim not being based upon "tort or tort type
rights"; it stated that satisfaction of the Burke inquiry is a
necessary, but not a sufficient condition. The Court noted, however,
that Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61, "seems to rely on the same
reading of Burke urged by [taxpayer]," but stated that interpretive
rulings do not have the force of regulations and may not be used to
overturn the plain language of a statute.
(1) Ruling on tax treatment of discrimination
damages after 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act. Rev. Rul. 93-
88, 1993-41 I.R.B. 4. Compensatory damages, including back pay,
received in satisfaction of a claim of "disparate treatment" gender
discrimination [discriminatory treatment by employer] under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 1991, are excludable
from gross income as §104 (a) (2) damages for personal injury -- even
if the compensatory damages are limited to back pay. However, back
pay received by a victim of "disparate impact" gender discrimination
[classification of employees not necessary for business purposes that
tends to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin] is not excludable from gross income. Compensatory
damages, including back pay, received in satisfaction of a claim of
racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §1981 and title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 are excludable from gross income as §104(a) (2)
damages for personal injury -- even if the compensatory damages are
limited to back pay. Similar results will apply under the Americans
With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§12101-12213.
(2) IRS to revise Rev. Rul. 93-88 (permitting
exclusion of certain damages not arising from personal injury) in
light of Schleier, and suspends ruling pending revision. Notice 95-45,
1995-34 I.R.B. 20. Rev. Rul. 93-88 suspended pending revision.
b. Damages received from labor union excludable.
Banks v. United States, 81 F.3d 874, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,212 (9th Cir.
4/16/96) (2-1). Damages received from labor union for breach of its
duty of fair representation were excludable from gross income under
§104(a) (2) because the damages were to compensate for the union's
unfair and arbitrary treatment of taxpayer, that the injuries suffered
were personal injuries and the settlement was of a tort-like cause of
action. (The majority noted that unions do not pay wages.) Dissent on
the ground that taxpayer suffered a non-physical personal injury, but
his lost wages were the result of his discharge and the union's
failure to grieve; the personal injury did not affect the amount of
back wages recovered. Both opinions cited Commissioner v. Schleier,
115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
c. Dotson v. United States, 87 F.3d 682, 96-2
U.S.T.C. 50,359 (5th Cir. 6/27/96) (2-1). Reverses District Court
(S.D. Texas) grant of government's summary judgment motion that
damages received pursuant to ERISA §§502(a) and 510 do not meet the
§104 (a) (2) personal injury exclusion from income because they were not
"tort-like." The remand was for the District Court to determine the
degree to which the award represented lost wages [to be taxable] as
distinguished from impairment of earning ability [to be excludable].
d. TAM 9634002 (4/1/96) .Damages in settlement of a
plant closing action brought under RICO held taxable, and not personal
injury damages excludable under §104(a) (2).
e. *Congress says discrimination damages are taxable;
§104 (a) (2) exclusion inapplicable to punitive damages, as well as to
damages not attributable to physical injuries or sickness -- and
emotional distress is not physical injury or sickness. SBT §1605
amends §104(a) (2) to repeal the exclusion for punitive damages and for
damages not attributable to physical injuries or sickness, effective
for amounts received after the date of enactment except for amounts
received under a written binding agreement, court decree or mediation
award on or before 9/13/95. Emotional distress (as such) is not to be
treated as a physical injury or physical sickness, but amounts
received to reimburse for medical expenses may be excluded. Exception
for wrongful death awards made in states in which only punitive
damages may be awarded in wrongful death actions, i.e., Alabama.
2. Punitive damages
a. Tenth Circuit: Punitive damages in physical
injury (wrongful death) action not excluded from gross income under
S104(A) (2); certiorari granted. O'Gilvie v. United States, 66 F.3d
1550, 95-2 U.S.T.C. 50,508 (10th Cir. 9/19/95), cert granted. The
Tenth Circuit joins the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Federal Circuits in
finding that punitive damages are not excludable from gross income
under §104(a)(2) because "exclusions from income are narrowly
construed." This case -- unlike the cases in those circuits --
involved physical injury, i.e., a products liability wrongful death
action based upon the death of taxpayers' wife and mother from toxic
shock syndrome.
b. *Congress says punitive damages are taxable. For
repeal of exclusion for punitive damages, see X.B.I.e., above. (Note:
The 1989 Act amended §104(a) (2) to deny exclusion of punitive damages
in connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical
sickness.)
3. Allocation of damage settlements
a. Court upholds allocation to punitive damages
based upon facts, even though no allocation to punitive damages was
made by either of the parties to the tort action. Bagley v.
Commissioner, 105 T.C. No. 27 (12/11/95) (reviewed, 18-0). Allocates
$1 million of recovery for tortious interference with future
employment to compensatory damages and $500,000 to punitive damages.
The Tax Court held that its decision in Horton v. Commissioner, 100
T.C. 93 (1993), aff'd, 33 F.3d 625, 94-2 U.S.T.C. 50,440 (6th Cir.
1994) (punitive damages are excludable from income under §104 (a) (2) if
the underlying claim is based on tort or tort-type rights) was
effectively overruled by Commissioner v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 2159,
95-1 U.S.T.C. 50,309 (1995). Although there was no allocation to
punitive damages in the tort case settlement, the Tax Court found that
it was in the interests of both parties not to show an amount
allocated to punitive damages; the Tax Court held that the $1 million
awarded by the jury for compensatory damages would be so allocated in
the settlement and the remaining $500,000 would be allocated to
punitive damages in light of the jury award for punitive damages of 2-
1/2 to 5 times the amount of compensatory damages.
b. Tax Court follows negotiated state court
allocation. McKay v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 465 (3/28/94). Taxpayer
who sued Ashland Oil for wrongful termination, seeking damages for
breach of contract and RICO violations [which culminated in a jury
award of more than $43 million], properly apportioned $12.25 million
of the $16.74 million settlement he received from Ashland Oil to the
tort claim of wrongful discharge, which was excludable from income
under §104(a) (2) as payment for a tort-type personal injury. The
court further held that deductions for legal expenses constituted
itemized deductions, not deductions from gross income.
(1) But, reversed because "wrongful discharge"
tort was not a personal injury. McKay v. Commissioner, 84 F.3d 433,
96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,279 (5th Cir. 4/10/96) (per curiam) (unpublished
opinion), vacating and remanding 102 T.C. 465 (1994). Under
Commissioner v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 2159 (U.S. 1995), the settlement
payment was not "received on account of personal injuries" within the
meaning of §104(a) (2) and the Tax Court erred as a matter of law in
deciding to the contrary.
c. Corporation not entitled to §104(a)(2) exclusion.
P & X Markets, Inc. v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. No. 26 (6/13/96). The
court held that a corporation operating a retail grocery store could
not exclude damages received for malicious prosecution, etc. as
personal injury damages under §104(a) (2) even though the corporation
had only one shareholder. Judge Laro held that when taxpayer chose to
do business in corporate form it assumed both the benefits and the
burdens of that form, and that the form would not be ignored under the
facts of this case.
d. Milenbach v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 184
(3/28/96). Damages received by the Oakland Raiders partnership in
settlement of a suit against the City of Oakland for inverse
condemnation of the Oakland Raiders football team were taxable as
damages in lieu of lost profits. Although the settlement agreement
stated that its purpose was to resolve a claim involving "restoration
of lost franchise value," the taxpayer's damage study indicated that
claim was based on lost profits.
4. Damages interest
a. Statutory prejudgment interest is part of
personal injury damages and excluded from gross income under
§104(a) (2). Brabson v. United States, 94-2 U.S.T.C. 50,446 (D. Colo.
8/15/94). Mandatory statutory prejudgment interest awarded in personal
injury case under Colorado law was excludable under §104(a)(2) because
it is in reality an element of compensatory damages, and not interest.
The court declined to follow the majority in Kovacs v. Commissioner,
100 T.C. 124 (1993), aff'd in unpublished opinion, (6th Cir. 6/9/94),
but instead adopted the analysis of Judge Beghe's dissent. Following
the Kovacs majority are Forest v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-377
(8/8/95), and Delaney v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-378 (8/8/95).
(1) *Reversed, following Kovacs. Brabson v.
United States, 73 F.3d 1040, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,038 (10th Cir.
1/11/96). Reverses district court, and holds (in a thoughtful opinion)
that statutorily mandated prejudgment interest is not an element of
personal injury damages and, therefore, does not fall within the
§104 (a) (2) exclusion. Kovacs v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 124 (1993),
aff'd without published opinion, 25 F.3d 1048 (6th Cir. 1994),
followed.
5. Goodwin v. United States, 67 F.3d 149, 95-2 U.S.T.C.
50,534 (8th Cir. 10/4/95). Affirms summary judgment holding that
minister was taxable on "gifts" made to him on three "special
occasion" days during the year by church members despite stipulations
that church members (1) made the gifts "out of love, respect,
admiration and like impulses and . . . not . . . out of any sense of
obligation or fear that [taxpayer] will leave their parish if he is
not compensated beyond his yearly salary," and (2) did not deduct the
money they gave the taxpayers as a charitable contribution. The court
applied the [alleged] "objective, no-talisman approach" of
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960), in finding the
payments to be income because they were "gathered by congregation
leaders in a routinized, highly structured program" and were large in
relation to taxpayer's salary. It found summary judgment to be
appropriate where "no reasonable jury could conclude that these
payments were excludable." The court held that the plain language of
§102(c) (1) [no exclusion of any amount transferred by an employer to
an employee], although enacted to address other fact situations, might
have been applicable here except that the church members were not
taxpayer's employer.
6. Notice 96-34, 1996-24 I.R.B. (5/23/96). Guidance
provided in Q&A format on the tax relief provided under the Act of
March 20, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-117, 110 Stat. 827 (1996), for U.S.
military and support personnel involved in the peacekeeping efforts in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Macedonia. Under this Act a
"qualified hazardous duty area" is to be treated for purposes of §112
as if it were a combat zone.
7. *Contract to purchase stock was §83 property when
taxpayer was personally obligated to pay the purchase price.
Theophilos v. Commissioner, 85 F.3d 440, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,293 (9th
Cir. 5/31/96). A contract to purchase stock was property under §83 -
and not an option -- when taxpayer became personally obligated to pay
the purchase price, regardless of whether he thought the stock
remained an attractive purchase. The stock was valued on the contract
date, not the closing date more than six months later.
8. Employer-provided educational assistance exclusion
extended to 5/31/97, and modified to make graduate courses ineligible.
SBT §1202 extends the expiration date of the §127 exclusion of
benefits under employer-provided educational assistance programs from
12/31/94 to 5/31/97 [but only for courses beginning before 7/1/97].
Graduate level courses [e.g., law, business, etc.] beginning after
6/30/96 will not be eligible for the exclusion of benefits.
9. Charley v. Commissioner, 91 F.3d 72, 96-2 U.S.T.C.
50,399 (9th Cir. 7/24/96). The taxpayer was the president and
majority shareholder of corporation. He arranged for a travel agent to
bill the corporation for first class airfare when he traveled on
corporate business, but the corporation bought coach tickets and the
taxpayer upgraded to first class using frequent flyer miles from
business travel. He received a cash rebate from the travel agency of
the spread between the price of coach and first class tickets. Held,
cash receipts were income, either as additional compensation from
employer or from sale of zero basis frequent flyer miles.
10. Expatriation tax rules are tightened by treating the
wealthy as having a tax avoidance purpose unless the individual falls
within an exception and requests a ruling within one year of loss of
citizenship. HIPPA §511 amends §877 to revise the expatriation tax
rules for individuals who lose United States citizenship, which
provide generally that the individual shall continue to be taxed as a
citizen for the following 10 years. The amended provision is generally
effective for individuals losing citizenship on or after 2/6/95.
Individuals with average annual income greater than $100,000, or net
worth of $500,000 or more are treated as having a tax avoidance
purpose unless the individual falls within an exception [e.g., dual
citizen, long-term foreign resident, renunciation upon reaching age of
majority] and a ruling request is submitted within the 1-year period
beginning on the date of the loss of citizenship.
11. When it's time to stop buying green bananas: Exclusion
from income of accelerated death benefits for the terminally ill and
(within limits) for the chronically ill. HIPAA §331 adds new §101(g)
to exclude from income certain accelerated death benefits paid with
respect to life insurance policies, including sales of life insurance
policies to viatical settlement companies. It covers both the
terminally ill (defined as having an illness or physical condition
which can reasonably be expected to result in death in 24 months or
less) and chronically ill (but only to the extent of payments for
costs incurred for qualified long-term care services provided),
applicable to amounts received after 12/31/96.
XI. PROCEDURE, PENALTIES AND PROSECUTIONS
A. Penalties and Prosecutions
1. *Automatic extensions of time to file held void
because taxpayer did not use a reasonable method to estimate tax
liability; IRS not estopped by acquiescence in taxpayer's method of
estimating in prior years. Healey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-260
(6/6/96). Law firm senior partner failed to use a reasonable method to
estimate tax liability when filing automatic extension Forms 4868, so
the forms were invalid and the §6651(a) failure to timely file penalty
applied. (Amounts reported on Forms 4868 were between 1/3 and 2/3 of
tax reported on Forms 1040 for the three years in question.)
2. Child penalized because her parents failed to file tax
returns for her. Bassett v. Commissioner, 67 F.3d 29, 95-2 U.S.T.C.
50,532 (2d Cir. 10/2/95) (2-1). Failure to file [i.e., lateness and
negligence] penalties affirmed against child actress whose parents
failed [without reasonable cause] in their §6012 (b) (2) responsibility
to file income tax returns for her. The court refused to apply the
exception permitted in United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985),
that "a disability alone could well be an acceptable excuse for a late
filing," because it was her parents -- and not the taxpayer -- who had
the duty to file the tax returns. Dissent on the ground that a
taxpayer should not be penalized for circumstances beyond her control,
and the assumption that parents act in pursuit of their children's
best interests is not necessarily correct [particularly when the
failure to pay taxes may serve to enrich the parents, and not the
child].
3. Durrett v. Commissioner, 71 F.3d 515, 96-1 U.S.T.C.
150,040 (5th Cir. 1/2/96). Increased interest [under former §6621(c)]
on underpayment attributable to "tax motivated transaction" [sham or
fraudulent transaction] upheld. Negligence penalty reversed because
taxpayer was acting reasonably in claiming the deductions in reliance
on advice from "experts" and was not required to seek a "second
opinion." Chamberlain v. Commissioner, 66 F.3d 729 (5th Cir. 1995),
followed.
4. Lauckner v. United States, 68 F.3d 69, 96-2 U.S.T.C.
950,364 (3d Cir. 10/23/95) (per curiam), acquiescence, AOD CC-1996-
006. Statute of limitations for §6672 assessments starts running with
the filing of the underlying employer's quarterly employment tax
return.
5. Is whether a statement is "materially" false for
purposes of the §7206(1) penalty a question of fact or law?
a. United States v. DiRico, 78 F.3d 732, 96-1
U.S.T.C. 50,149 (1st Cir. 3/11/96), held that whether a statement on
a return is "material" is a mixed question of law and fact to be
decided by the jury.
b. United States v. Klausner, 80 F.3d 55, 96-1
U.S.T.C. 50,173 (2d Cir. 3/27/96), held that whether false itemized
deductions knowingly claimed by a CPA on his own initiative in
preparing a client's tax return were material is a question of law
because a false deduction will inevitably affect tax liability.
6. Finley v. United States, 82 F.3d 966, 96-1 U.S.T.C.
50,245 (10th Cir. 5/1/96). A responsible person's re-delegation of
his duty to remit taxes to a subordinate [whom the responsible person
already knew had failed to remit taxes] was so irresponsible as to be
"willful" as a matter of law. Judgment entered for the government
"notwithstanding a jury verdict in the taxpayer's favor" was affirmed.
7. Changes to the §6672 responsible person penalty. T2
§§901-904 amend §6672 to increased rights, remedies and exemptions for
responsible persons penalized under Code §6672, including (1)
disclosure of IRS attempts to recover taxes from a third party, (2)
creation of a federal right of contribution as among multiple
responsible persons, and (3) volunteer board members of tax exempt
organizations are exempted from the penalty if they were acting solely
in an honorary capacity, did not participate in day-to-day financial
operations and did not have actual knowledge of the failure to pay
trust fund taxes.
B. Summons
1. Cash Payment Reporting
a. Summons enforcement affirmed. United States v.
Blackman, 72 F.3d 1418, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,018 (9th Cir. 12/29/95).
Affirms summons enforcement on lawyer requiring him to provide
information as to the client-payors of cash of more than $10,000
pursuant to §60501 on Forms 8300. The court rejected lawyer's
contention that the IRS was not investigating his firm's tax
liability, and was therefore required to use the §7609(f) "John Doe
summons" procedure because there was no "compelling evidence" to
support lawyer's allegations concerning the IRS's motives for its
investigation sufficient to overturn the district court's finding of
legitimacy.
b. Tedder & Associates, Inc. v. United States, 77
F.3d 1166, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,135 (9th Cir. 2/27/96). 'Affirms district
court finding that third-party summons to law firm's bank could be
complied with by furnishing sought-for information to the district
court, which redacted client names because these names were not
relevant to the audit of the law firm's return.
c. Gerald B. Lefcourt, P.C. v. United States, 96-2
U.S.T.C. 50,345 (S.D. N.Y. 5/13/96). Attorney's refund suit for
refund of $25,000 penalty paid for failure to identify client who made
cash payments on Form 8300 dismissed on summary judgment, even though
the information required by §60501 is claimed to be privileged [in the
absence of special circumstances under which there is a direct link
between the disclosure and the revelation of a confidential
communication, or where the disclosure of client-identifying
information would directly incriminate the client by providing the
last link in an existing chain of evidence against the client]. "The
fact remains that attorneys not wishing to file 8300 Forms may insist
on payment by check."
2. Attorney-client privilege does not apply to accounting
firm's tax planning memorandum supplied both to corporation's VP for
taxes [an attorney] and to other corporate officers. United States v.
Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 95-2 U.S.T.C. 50,579 (2d Cir. 10/26/95, amended
11/1/95). The attorney-client privilege does not apply to a 53-page
Arthur Andersen memorandum prepared for Sequa Corporation, which
memorandum advised on the form a proposed plan of restructuring should
take. The memorandum was written to Sequa's VP for Taxes (who was a
lawyer], but who was "not expert in the highly complex corporate
reorganization provisions [of the tax code]."
a. The district court found the attorney-client
privilege inapplicable to advice from accountants. Sequa contended
that Arthur Andersen's advice came within the privilege under United
States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961), because the advice was
rendered to Adlman to assist him in giving legal advice to his client
Sequa. However, there were also direct communications between Arthur
Andersen and non-lawyer officers of Sequa.
(1) Further, there was no separate engagement
letter for the work embodied in this memorandum, but it was billed
together with other work -- clearly unprivileged -- performed by the
accounting firm during the same period. The Second Circuit stated that
a separate engagement letter was not a requirement, but that the
absence of contemporaneous documentation of the Kovel contention
supported the district court's finding.
b. The case was remanded for findings as to whether
work product doctrine applies, which the district court had held
inapplicable because the events giving rise to the anticipated
litigation -- i.e., the proposed merger -- had not yet occurred. Judge
Leval's Second Circuit opinion stated that, although the non-
occurrence of events giving rise to the anticipated litigation is a
factor arguing against applicability of the doctrine [when the
expected litigation is "merely, a vague abstract possibility without
precise form"], the work product doctrine does apply although the
events have not yet occurred if the expected litigation is being
"immediately contemplated" [when the expected litigation is "quite
concrete"].
3. United States v. Kao, 81 F.3d 114, 96-1 U.S.T.C.
50,203 (9th Cir. 4/11/96). The IRS cannot evade §7609 procedures by
using its §7602 summons power to compel taxpayer to sign consent forms
authorizing release of records by third party record-keepers whom IRS
could summons under §7609.
C. Litigation Costs
1. Attorney's fees in excess of $75 per hour approved,
but quietly. First Interstate Bank of California v. Purewell
Investment, Inc., 96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,129 (9th Cir. 1/26/96)
(unpublished). Affirms §7430 attorney's fee award of $270 per hour for
experienced San Francisco tax litigator (whose experience included
cases involving liens and levies) associated with a Hong Kong firm.
(District court had found that these factors were necessary in order
to resolve the case efficiently.) [Related case to Gaw v.
Commissioner, see D., below.]
2. Swanson v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 76 (2/14/96).
Taxpayer's failure to seek an appeals conference was not a failure to
exhaust administrative remedies because no 30 day letter was issued
before the deficiency notice was issued. The net worth ceiling is
determined with respect to purchase price of assets, not fair market
value.
3. United States v. Yochum (In re Yochum), 89 F.3d 661,
96-2 U.S.T.C. 50,390 (9th Cir. 7/16/96). Bankruptcy courts have
jurisdiction to award §7430 attorneys' fees because they are units of
the district courts, but bankruptcy court erred in awarding such fees
because the IRS was justified in bringing claim.
4. Congress raises attorneys fees to $110 per hour, among
other changes. T2 §§ 701-703 amend §7430 tomake changes in attorney fee
awards, including (1) placing the burden of proof on the Service that
it was substantially justified in maintaining its position and (2)
raising the statutory rate for attorney's fees from $75 to $110 per
hour (indexed for inflation after 1996).
D. Statutory Notice
1. Appeals court finds statutory notice valid, but
extends time to file petition to Tax Court. Gaw v. Commissioner, 45
F.3d 461, 95-1 U.S.T.C. 50,059 (D.C. Cir. 1/31/95), rev'g and
remanding T.C. Memo. 1993-379. IRS did not exercise reasonable
diligence in complying with its equitable obligation to send a
statutory notice to taxpayers' last known address when it sent a $28
million deficiency notice to their Hong Kong address after being
advised they would be in Burma for a prolonged period. IRS should have
contacted taxpayers' Hong Kong law firm (which had written it) to
inform it that the IRS needed a power of attorney in order to provide
the firm with a copy of the deficiency notice. Taxpayer filed a tax
court petition 11 days after receiving a copy of the deficiency notice
during collection procedures. Held: the statutory notice was valid to
toll the §6503(a) (1) statute of limitations, but the time to file the
petition did not begin to run until the taxpayers actually received a
copy of the notice.
a. Action on Decision 1996-004 -- Nonacquiescence in
Gaw. The IRS takes the position that the time for filing a Tax Court
petition is established by statute, and the Code does not provide for
the tolling or suspension of the time to file a petition.
2. *Taxpayer who refuses delivery of mail from IRS is
held to have "actual notice" of the notice of deficiency. Erhard v.
Commissioner, 87 F.3d 273, 96-2 U.S.T.C. 50,331 (9th Cir. 6/20/96).
Taxpayer was considered to have "actual notice" of two notices of
deficiency when she received a letter [allegedly misaddressed]
containing the notices, and [upon the advice of her attorney] refused
delivery of the letter and never opened it. Judge Hall held that this
was sufficient for taxpayer to have received actual notice, based upon
Patmon & Young Professional Corp. v. Commissioner, 55 F.3d 216 (6th
Cir. 1995).
3. Elgart v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-379 (8/15/96).
Taxpayers mailed their Tax Court petition by certified mail in an
envelope bearing a U.S. postmark date of March 14, 1996. The court
dismissed their petition for lack of jurisdiction, rejecting
taxpayers' argument that their attorney was advised by several IRS
employees that the due date for a petition filed in response to a
statutory notice dated December 14, 1995 was March 14, 1996. In fact,
the 90-day period expired on March 13th, and that date is
jurisdictional so the Commissioner cannot waive it and jurisdiction
cannot be established by estoppel. Taxpayers were relegated to a suit
for refund after payment of the tax.
E. Statute of Limitations
1. Can a taxpayer keep an erroneous refund? If the IRS
makes an erroneous refund to a taxpayer, it clearly can recover the
amount erroneously refunded through a suit for an erroneous refund
under §7405 or by assessing a new deficiency if the statute of
limitations on the year with respect to which the refund was made has
not expired. But, if the IRS erroneously refunds a payment of a
previously assessed deficiency and then seeks to recover the erroneous
refund based on the prior assessment, the taxpayer may be able to keep
the refund.
a. Taxpayer has windfall when assessment is
mistakenly extinguished by misapplying a payment meant for another
year to the year assessed; when the mistake was corrected, the
assessment did not revive. Clark v. United States, 63 F.3d 83, 95-1
U.S.T.C. 50,037 (D. N.H. 12/13/94), aff'd, 95-2 U.S.T.C. T50,469 (1st
Cir. 8/29/95). IRS barred from collecting a timely-assessed tax
liability for 1985 where it mistakenly extinguished the liability by
misapplying a payment intended for the 1986 tax year. The 1985
liability was not revived when the IRS corrected its mistake by
crediting the payment to 1986. The court noted that the taxpayer
received an undeserved windfall because he made only one payment and
benefited twice, but the court was not about to do anything to prevent
it from happening.
b. Bilzerian v. United States, 86 F3d 1067, 96-2
U.S.T.C. 50,356 (11th Cir. 7/1/96). An erroneous refund cannot be
collected by the IRS on the basis of the prior assessment -- the
payment extinguishes the deficiency that was assessed -- and the IRS
must either reassess the tax and issue a new deficiency notice if the
statute of limitations has not expired, which is unlikely, or resort
to an erroneous refund suit. The erroneous refund does not revive the
extinguished assessment.
c. But what if the taxpayer gives back the erroneous
refund and then wants it back.
(1) Singleton v. United States, 96-1 U.S.T.C.
50,320, 77 AFTR2d 2508 (E.D. N.C. 5/8/96), held that a taxpayer who
voluntarily repays an erroneous refund based on an IRS assessment
without issuance of a deficiency notice has waived the defective
procedure and could not recover the repaid erroneous refund. Repayment
constituted a waiver of the procedural defect.
(2) Stanley v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 493,
96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,273 (Fed. Cl. 5/1/96), held that a taxpayer can
recover a voluntary repayment of an erroneous refund if IRS did not
follow proper procedures in seeking repayment.
2. Fourth Circuit: Nonfiler who was overwithheld may
obtain refund 2-1/2 years after return was due. Lundy v. IRS, 45 F.3d
856, 95-1 U.S.T.C. 50,085 (4th Cir. 1/30/95), cert. granted, 115 S.
Ct. 2244 (5/30/95), rev'g and remanding T.C. Memo. 1993-278. Taxpayer
received a deficiency notice a little after two years from the date
his tax return was due; he filed his tax return shortly thereafter and
sought a refund of amounts withheld. Held: the Tax Court had
jurisdiction to determine the amount of taxpayer's overpayment and
order a refund because taxpayer paid his taxes within three years
prior to the date of the mailing of the deficiency notice;
§6512(b) (3) (B) did not mandate a two-year refund period in the Tax
Court while the Court of Federal Claims and the district courts would
have applied a three-year period under §6511(b) (2). Richards [94-2
U.S.T.C. 50,542] and Miller [94-2 U.S.T.C. 50,566] not followed.
a. Supreme Court: Reversed, overwithheld nonfiler
has only 2 years within which to claim refund. Commissioner v. Lundy,
116 S. Ct. 647, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,035 (U.S. 1/17/96) (7-2), rev' 45
F.3d 856 (3d Cir. 1995). Taxpayers not entitled to recover amounts
withheld in excess of federal income taxes actually owed for the 1987
year when they did not file a return for that year until after the IRS
mailed a notice of deficiency 2-1/2 years after the return was due.
Held, §6512(b) (3) (B) provides for only a 2-year "look-back" period,
not the 3-year period applicable where a return is filed before the
IRS mails its notice of deficiency. Dissent on the ground that IRS
policy [Rev. Rul. 76-511, 1976-2 C.B. 428, construing 6511(a)] is to
allow a 3-year look-back period where suit is filed in the district
court, instead of in the Tax Court where taxpayers filed.
3. Terminating Form 872-A extensions
a. Closing agreement does not terminate Form 872-A
extension. Silverman v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 157 (9/6/95). A closing
agreement permitting assessment of taxes within one year did not
terminate taxpayers' indefinite extension of the period of limitations
by Forms 872-A. The limitations period remained open for 90 days after
taxpayers submitted Forms 872-T, and the notices of deficiency were
issued within that period [although later than one year after the
closing agreement, which contained no language addressing the Forms
872-A].
(1) . . and First Circuit affirms. Silverman
v. Commissioner, 96-2 U.S.T.C. 50,327 (1st Cir. 6/20/96). A Form 906
closing agreement will not terminate indefinite extensions made with
Forms 872-A. The court stated that if taxpayers "had intended to limit
IRS to the time specified in the Form 906 closing agreement, they need
simply have filed Forms 872-T, as they eventually did."
b. Forms 872-T may not be filed into an IRS rathole.
Coggin v. Commissioner, 71 F.3d 855, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,033 (11th Cir.
1/4/96). Forms 872-T sent by experienced tax attorney (who chaired ABA
Tax Section's Natural Resources Subcommittee on Coal Taxation) to
collections agent no longer involved in his case "for [her] case file
[which was limited to collection of a deficiency related to his
deduction of alimony]" were ineffective to terminate his extensions on
Forms 872-A because he did not send the forms to the "Internal Revenue
Service office considering the case" (as required by the forms'
instructions). Notice of deficiency issued by the Commissioner within
90 days of the discovery of the termination notices was timely. Return
receipt that stated that the addressee was "[Collection Agent's name]
Attn: Chief Examination Division" did not provide constructive notice
to the IRS when the envelope containing the Forms 872-T was addressed
to "[Collection Agent's name] Internal Revenue Service Revenue Agent"
because there is no requirement that the IRS cross-check every return
receipt with its matching envelope.
4. Equitable tolling
a. *"Gift taxes" paid by thieves to cover up their
thefts are not recoverable by victim kept isolated by thieves because
she did not regain her freedom until after the statute of limitations
had run for claiming a refund of gift taxes. Webb v. United States,
66 F.3d 691, 95-2 U.S.T.C. 50,531 (4th Cir. 10/2/95) (2-1). The §6511
statute of limitations applicable in tax refund suits was not subject
to equitable tolling, and taxpayer's administrator's claim for
recovery of about $4 million of gift taxes paid while taxpayer was
cruelly abused and defrauded [kept drugged up and isolated] by her
physician and attorney was time barred. The majority refused to apply
the decision in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89
(1990) (statutory time limits for suits against the United States were
subject to equitable tolling) to tax refund suits. The court stated
that "taxes are the life blood of government."
b. *Equitable tolling may be allowed (on proper
showing) for incapacitated geriatric who mistakenly sent IRS a large
check; certiorari granted. Brockamp v. United States, 67 F.3d 260, 95-
2 U.S.T.C. 50,551 (9th Cir. 10/5/95) (2-1), cert. granted, 6/3/96.
Taxpayer's administrator will be permitted to show that 93-year-old
taxpayer lacked mental capacity when he mistakenly sent a $7,000 check
with an application for automatic extension of time and did not take
further action because of his senility. Dissent on the ground that
Congress intended to create a "tesselated scheme" to assure that the
government can, after a time, be assured that its receipts can be
counted upon.
5. Fruit of the Loom, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 F.3d 1338,
96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,037 (7th Cir. 1/5/96). Transferee's predecessor
(taxpayer) sold assets in 1966 for a $19 million promissory note that
was cancelled in 1967, but took the $19 million deduction in 1966. On
audit, the IRS disallowed the 1966 deduction, but agreed to an
overassessment for 1967 -- with respect to which $10 million was
subsequently refunded following Joint Committee approval. However, the
IRS could not rely on the §§1311-1314 mitigation of limitations
provisions to make a determination disallowing a double deduction for
the closed 1966 year because the double deduction arose because of the
Commissioner's failure to send a timely notice of deficiency before
making its assessment for 1966 (which was ruled to be illegal and the
IRS was required to refund all amounts collected pursuant to it). The
court held there was no "determination" affecting the 1967 year for
which the deduction was actually taken because the court's ruling was
simply about the ineffectiveness of the assessment for the 1966 year,
and further held that taxpayer did not take inconsistent positions.
6. Mitigation of limitations under §1311-1314 not
available to lawyer who underreported value of stock received from
client in 1974 and failed to deduct loss in 1977 when stock became
worthless. Is any other relief available? Koss v. United States, 69
F.3d 705, 95-2 U.S.T.C. 50,599 (3d Cir. 11/7/95) . Taxpayer/lawyer
received 22,000 shares of client stock in 1974, and reported the
stock's value at $4,400 (2 cents per share), and in 1977 the IRS began
an examination of the 1974 return. The client stock became worthless
in 1977, but taxpayer did not claim a loss on his 1977 tax return. A
deficiency of about $50,000 was asserted, based upon valuing the
client stock at $110,000 ($5 per share), which was sustained by the
Tax Court [and Third Circuit], becoming final in 1990. In 1991,
taxpayer filed an amended return for the 1977 year that (1) indicated
the worthlessness of the client stock and (2) filed an amended return
for the 1974 year that requested an adjustment based on the carryback
of the net operating loss to 1974. Held, this suit is barred by the
statute of limitations and mitigation of limitations is inapplicable
because, inter alia, the IRS did not maintain inconsistent positions
(but merely accepted a 1977 return that did not indicate that the
client stock was worthless). Judge Greeenberg noted, in conclusion,
that it was stated on oral argument that taxpayer's debt to the IRS
exceeded $300,000 (because of the inclusion of interest) and continued
as follows:
Yet, it is very possible that, but for the operation of the
non-substantive, highly technical procedural provisions that
have been applied, [taxpayer] would not owe this money. We
are disturbed by the harsh result. Perhaps [taxpayer], under
the unusually oppressive circumstances here, still may
obtain administrative relief from the IRS, or some other
authority. [69 F.3d at 711]
7. *Bachner v. Commissioner, 81 F.3d 1274, 96-1 U.S.T.C.
50,217 (3d Cir. 4/17/96). Section 6512(a) confers jurisdiction on the
Tax Court to determine that there was an overpayment for a year if
after receipt of a deficiency notice the taxpayer files a petition in
the Tax Court, even though the assessment itself is held to be barred
by the statute of limitations.
8. *Don't forget the duty of consistency Eagan v. United
States, 80 F.3d 13, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,184 (1st Cir. 3/29/96) Taxpayer
was an insurance agent for an insurance company that made
contributions to a 401(k) plan on his behalf, which taxpayer claimed
were tax-free contributions on his behalf as an employee. After in a
related case involving employment taxes the Commissioner conceded that
the taxpayer was an independent contractor in year the contributions
were made. The taxpayer attempted to exclude the distributions from
income as a return of capital, arguing that the earlier exclusion, now
time barred, was erroneous. Held: A taxpayer is bound by the duty of
consistency if the taxpayer makes a representation or reports a
position, on which the government, relies, and (after the statute of
limitations has run) the taxpayer attempts to change the previous
representation to the detriment of the government. In such a case the
government may treat the original representation as correct even if it
is not. The distributions were taxable.
F. Miscellaneous
1. Innocent Spouse
a. Tax understatement arising from overstatement of
cost of goods sold is omitted income, and does not arise from a
claimed "deduction, credit or basis." In re Lilly (Lilly v. IRS), 76
F.3d 568, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,113 (4th Cir. 2/20/96). Upholds innocent
spouse claim based upon overstatement of cost of goods sold -- even
though taxpayer failed to produce evidence that the overstatement of
COGS was without any basis in fact or law [as is required under
§6013(e)(2) (B) for understatements in tax stemming from claims of
deduction, credit or basis] -- because an overstatement of COGS is a
§6013(e) (2) (A) omission of an item of gross income. The court held
that COGS is an inventory accounting concept, not "basis" (which
determines a taxpayer's capital stake in property and has the same
meaning in §6013(e) (2) (B) as it has in §§1011-1023) . Query: §1013
(Basis of property included in inventory: "If the property should have
been included in the last inventory, the basis shall be the last
inventory value thereof.")?
b. Wiksell v. Commissioner, 90 F.3d 1459, 96-2
U.S.T.C. 50,398 (9th Cir. 7/25/96), permitted "apportioned" innocent
spouse relief because spouse had reason to know of a substantial
understatement of income but no reason to know that the magnitude of
the understatement was as great as it was.
2. Improper Disclosure of §6103 Tax Return Information
a. Circular letters not sent in good faith. Barrett
v. United States, 51 F.3d 475, 95-1 U.S.T.C. 50,232 (5th Cir.
4/20/95), rev'g and remanding 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,291 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
Circular letter to 386 patients of a plastic surgeon that requested
information and informed them that the surgeon was being criminally
investigated improperly disclosed tax return information because it
was not necessary for the letters to say that the investigation was
criminal. The court found that the letters were not sent in good faith
because the requirements of the Internal Revenue Manual were not
followed, particularly the requirement that the Chief of the CID
approve the content of all circular letters; however, approved letters
under the relevant IRM provision would have contained "Special Agent"
and "Criminal Investigation Division" in the signature block. Also
found pertinent was the fact that letters were sent to patients in
three years not under investigation, as well as patients in the two
years that were.
(1) On remand, only statutory damages for
disclosure of tax return information -- no punitive damages because
only a technical violation. Barrett v. United States, 96-1 U.S.T.C.
50,082 (S.D. Tex. 12/6/95). Disclosures to plastic surgeon's patients
in circular letters that he was under criminal tax investigation gave
rise to only $260,000 in statutory damages. Punitive damages were
inappropriate because IRS agent's conduct in stating that Dr. Barrett
was under criminal tax investigation was not willful or grossly
negligent because the Internal Revenue Manual form letter has the
words "Criminal Investigation Division" in the signature block, and
also §7431(c) precludes the award of punitive damages in the absence
of actual damages.
(2) Contra to Fifth Circuit's Barrett holding,
disclosures were "necessary." Rhodes v. United States, 903 F. Supp.
819, 95-2 U.S.T.C. 50,622 (M.D. Pa. 10/13/95). District court adheres
to its earlier opinion, which was based on Judge Harmon's 1993 opinion
in Barrett [93-1 U.S.T.C 50,291] that was reversed by the Fifth
Circuit, 3.b., above. Contrary to the Fifth Circuit's holding that
nonconformity with prescribed procedures renders disclosures in
circular letters unauthorized, the court held that disclosures in
circular letters may be "necessary" to get the desired responses,
i.e., the Fifth Circuit used an overly restrictive definition of
"necessary" as applies to §6103.
b. *Tax return information once disclosed in a
federal tax lien becomes public, so republication is exempt from
confidentially requirements. Rowley v. United States, 76 F.3d 796, 96-
1 U.S.T.C. 50,123 (6th Cir. 2/27/96). Affirms summary judgment for
United States in taxpayers' §7431(a) suit for wrongful disclosure of
tax return information because, after a federal tax lien is filed and
recorded, the taxpayers' return information contained therein becomes
a matter of public record and republication is exempt from
confidentiality requirements. Follows Ninth Circuit [Lampert v. United
States, 854 F.2d 335 (1988), and Schrambling Accountancy Corp. v.
United States, 937 F.2d 1485 (1991)], and refuses to follow the Tenth
[Rodgers v. Hyatt, 697 F.2d 899 (1983)] and Fourth Circuits [Mallas v.
United States, 993 F.2d 1111 (1993)]; Rodgers v. Hyatt and Mallas were
also distinguished on the ground that recording a tax lien (which is
designed to provide public notice) is quantitatively different from
disclosures made in judicial proceedings (which are only incidentally
made public).
C. Federal Tort Claims Act multimillion dollar
judgment for IRS post-conviction press release affirmed, but en banc
rehearing ordered. Johnson v. Sawyer, 980 F.2d 1490, 93-1 U.S.T.C.
50,065 (5th Cir. 12/29/92) (2-1), aff'g, modifying, rendering and
remanding 760 F. Supp. 1216, 91-2 U.S.T.C. 50,302 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
IRS press release following Johnson's guilty plea to tax evasion
violated §6103 and constituted negligence per se under Texas law, so
recovery of damages against the United States under Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) was proper. The action was not preempted by former
§7217, nor by the tax assessment and collection exception to the FTCA.
The §6103 violations resulted in the guilty plea becoming a matter of
public knowledge by adding to the information in the court record such
additional information as Johnson's middle initial, his age, his home
address and his official job title. Remanded for recomputation of the
$10 million plus damages. Dissent on the ground that IRS violations of
§6103 did not give rise to a cause of action under FTCA and did not in
any event cause Johnson's damage. Neither majority nor dissent relied
upon an agreement that the U.S. Attorney's office would not issue a
press release on the conviction. Note Supplemental and amending panel
decision, 4 F.3d 369, 93-2 U.S.T.C. 50,582 (5th Cir. 10/14/93)
(majority holds for Johnson on his invasion of privacy cause of
action, stating that while §6103 did not create a duty, it did
establish a standard of conduct to the duty not to improperly
publicize embarrassing or damaging private facts about another person.
The dissent notes that Johnson's recovery is based on federal, not
Texas, law contrary to the Federal Tort Claims Act, and that no
material damage proximately resulting from the §6103 violation was
shown). On 10/28/93, en banc rehearing was granted by the Fifth
Circuit.
(1) Judgment reversed on rehearing en banc.
Reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss Federal Tort Claims
Act claim, 47 F.3d 716, 95-1 U.S.T.C. 50,159 (5th Cir. 3/16/95) (en
banc, 2 judges dissenting). Plaintiff failed to establish the elements
of either the Texas tort of invasion of privacy [because no
embarrassing private facts were disclosed in the press release] or the
Texas negligence per se doctrine [no Texas court has ever found a duty
in a statute [here, I.R.C. §6103(a)] which provides another
comprehensive and express private cause of action].
(2) *Judgment against individual defendants
entered in accordance with jury verdict. Johnson v. Sawyer, 96-2
U.S.T.C. 50,337 (S.D. Tex. 5/15/96). Action for damages against five
individual IRS employees (who participated in the issuance of press
releases) under §6103(a) [and former §7217] results in a verdict of $6
million of compensatory damages and a total of $3 million of punitive
damages. Judge Hoyt held that Judge Singleton's findings of fact in
the Federal Tort Claims action [with respect to what the individual
defendants did] had not been overturned by the Fifth Circuit, and
castigated the U.S. Attorney from the Department of Justice for
"insist[ing], in an unprofessional and disingenuous way, that the
opposite was true."
d. Ryan v. United States, 74 F.3d 1161, 96-1
U.S.T.C. 50,126 (11th Cir. 2/14/96). Only information that has been
processed by the IRS can be return information. Section 6103 does not
apply to information regarding tax liability collected by a United
States attorney from other sources, such as potential witnesses in a
criminal trial, even if an IRS special agent assisted the U.S.
attorney.
3. Cluck v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 324 (10/30/95).
Taxpayer filed a joint return with her husband and a deficiency was
sought with respect to the sale of property he had inherited from his
mother, who died in 1983. Her husband stipulated in the estate tax
proceeding that the property had a fair market value of $355,000 at
the date of his mother's death. Husband's tax liability for the year
of the sale was adjudicated in the bankruptcy court. In this Tax Court
proceeding, taxpayer-wife claimed that the property was actually worth
$625,000 at her mother-in-law's death. The court held that she was
bound by the stipulation under the [quasi-estoppel] "duty of
consistency" because she and her husband had "closely aligned legal
and economic interests."
4. Daccarett-Ghia v. v. Commissioner, 70 F.3d 621, 95-2
U.S.T.C. 50,626 (D.C. Cir. 11/28/95). Taxpayer, a citizen and
resident of Colombia, was a fugitive from a money laundering
indictment in a New Jersey federal court. He petitioned the Tax Court
for a redetermination of a deficiency based upon a jeopardy
assessment, but the Tax Court dismissed under the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine. Reversed, because there was no connection
between taxpayer's fugitive status and the Tax Court proceeding.
Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234 (1993), interpreted
and followed.
5. T.D. 8651, temporary regulations under §6081,
reflecting simpler procedures for an individual to obtain an automatic
extension of time to file a federal income tax return (1/4/96).
Extensions may be obtained without remitting the unpaid amount of tax
estimated to be due and without signing the Form 4868.
6. Closing agreement that was "final and conclusive" did
not protect against subsequent retroactive legislation reducing the
amount of credit taxpayer could use, where there was no dispute as to
the amount of credit. United States v. National Steel Corp., 75 F.3d
1146, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,071 (7th Cir. 2/1/96) (Posner, CJ). Form 906
closing agreement in connection with the payment of an anticipatory
refund of 1987 taxes [prior to taxpayer filing its 1987 tax return]
(based upon provision to apply certain unused tax credits for steel
manufacturers in 1987 years, contained in §212(a) of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986) did not bar government suit for refund when the Technical
and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 retroactively amended that
provision to exclude tax credits that accrued in 1986. The provision
in the closing agreement that it was "final and conclusive" applied
to the points agreed to by the parties, i.e., a waiver of the statute
of limitations, a quick release of the claimed overpayment, and a
three-year period for taxpayer's investment of the tax savings in
steel manufacture.
7. Pert v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 370 (11/15/95). Closing
agreement made with transferor binds the transferee (who may not
contest the deficiencies established by the §7121 closing agreement,
except on the grounds available to the parties to the closing
agreement (fraud, malfeasance, or misrepresentation of a material
fact).
8. *IRS may, but is not required to, net interest on
overpayments and underpayments. Northern States Power Co. v. United
States, 73 F.3d 764, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,022 (8th Cir. 1/2/96). The
court looked at the text of the Code -- and ignored legislative
history because the Code provisions were unambiguous -- to find that
IRS not required to credit overpayments against liabilities of other
tax years for §6601(f) interest-netting purposes because the IRS has
discretion to [but is not required to] credit outstanding overpayments
against outstanding underpayments under §6402 (a). The "netting" method
of interest calculation would have entitled taxpayer to an additional
$460,000 -- based upon a tax payment of about $23 million that gave
rise to previously unclaimed tax credits of about $9 million.
9. T.D. 8654, final regulations under §6050P, relating to
the reporting of cancellation of indebtedness income by financial
entities (1/3/96). An exclusive list of eight identifiable events is
provided, including bankruptcy discharge, expiration of statute of
limitations, extinguishment pursuant to an election of foreclosure
remedies, creditor decision to discontinue collection activity, etc.
10. *No relief for taxpayer who sees a familiar face from
his past at the government's counsel table. Harker v. Commissioner, 82
F.3d 806, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,244 (8th Cir. 5/3/96).The Tax Court [Rule
201(a)] has adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, so [under
Model Rule 1.11(c) (1)] an IRS attorney who had been an associate in
the [four-person] law firm that represented taxpayers in criminal
proceedings, but was not personally and substantially involved in
their criminal tax cases while at the law firm, was not disqualified
from representing the Commissioner in their deficiency trial in the
Tax Court. The result would have been otherwise under the old Model
Code of Professional Responsibility. Judge Bowman concluded by noting
that the government did not use "its best judgment" in assigning the
attorney to the case and should have assigned another attorney.
11. 1996 Legislation
a. *Taxpayer Advocate. T2 §§101 and 102 amend §§7802
and 7811 to establish the office of Taxpayer Advocate, with authority
to order the Service to take any action that is permitted by law and
is necessary to relieve significant financial hardship. Effective on
the date of enactment.
b. *Installment agreements. T2 §§201 and 202 amend
§6159 to require the Service to notify a taxpayer of its reasons for
terminating, modifying or altering an existing installment agreement
at least 30 days before doing so [effective 6 months after date of
enactment, but Reg. §301.6159-1 already requires the Service to do
this], and to establish procedures for review of installment agreement
procedures [effective 1/1/97].
c. *Interest abatement. T2 §§301 and 302 amend §6404
(1) to expand the Service's authority to abate interest in situations
where managerial acts results in unreasonable error or delay in
resolving a taxpayer dispute [effective for interest accruing with
respect to deficiencies for tax years beginning after the date of
enactment], and (2) to give the Tax Court jurisdiction to review
denials of requests for interest abatement [effective for requests
after the date of enactment].
(1) The Tax Court adopted interim Rules 280-284
to govern litigation under the provision of T2 that permits judicial
review of IRS decisions not to abate interest (9/30/96). The
prerequisites for jurisdiction are that the Commissioner has mailed a
notice of final determination not to abate interest under Code Section
6404 and that the taxpayer has filed a timely "Petition for Review of
Failure to Abate Interest under Code Section 6404."
d. Interest-free period after notice and demand
extended. T2 §303 amends §6601 to extend the interest-free period
after the date of a notice and demand from 10 days to 21 calendar
days, if the amount of tax is less than $100,000, or otherwise to 10
business days. Effective for notices and demands issued after
12/31/96.
e. *Disclosure of collection authority related to a
joint return. T2 §403 added §6013(e) (8) to provide for disclosure of
collection activity with respect to one spouse [who had filed a joint
return] to the other spouse, where the spouses are divorced or
separated. Effective on date of enactment.
f. Lien and levy changes. T2 §§ 501 and 502 make
lien and levy changes, effective on the date of enactment.
g. Offers in compromise. T2 §503 amends §7122 to
increase from $500 to $50,000 the threshold amount of unpaid tax for
which an offer in compromise must be approved by the Office of Chief
Counsel, effective upon enactment.
h. *Remedies for recipients of false information
returns. T2 §§601-602 and 1201 provide increased remedies for
taxpayers who receive false 1099s: (1) T2 §601 adds new §7434 to
provide for civil damage suits against fraudulent filers of false
information returns (with minimum damages of $5,000]; (2) T2 §602 adds
new §6201(d) which requires the IRS to conduct a "reasonable
investigation" of disputed information returns; and (3) T2 §1201
amends numerous Code sections to add a requirement that the telephone
number of the "information contact" person of the filer be included on
the information return. Effective on date of enactment, except that T2
§1201 applies to statements required to be furnished after 12/31/96.
i. Relief from retroactive regulations. T2 §1101
amends §7805 to provide relief under certain circumstances from the
retroactive application of regulations.
j. Remedy where government entices taxpayer's
representative into furnishing client taxpayer information. T2 §1203
provides a remedy [of up to $500,000] where a taxpayer representative
is "enticed" into furnishing client taxpayer information.
k. *Designated private delivery services may provide
"postmark" to prove date of mailing; high standards established for
designation. T2 §1204 adds new §7502(f) to permit taxpayers to prove
date of mailing by use of electronic records of receipt by publicly-
available delivery services. One requirement for designation is that
the delivery service must be "at least as timely and reliable on a
regular basis as the United States mail."
1. Extends mathematical or clerical error
procedures. SBT §1614 provides that the mathematical or clerical error
procedures are to be used for dependency exemptions and filing status
when correct taxpayer identification numbers are not provided,
effective for tax returns for which the due date (without regard to
extensions) is 30 days or more after enactment.
12. Estate of Leggett v. United States, 96-2 U.S.T.C.
, 78 AFTR2d 6344, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12833 (S.D. Tex. 8/22/96).
Continuing tax lien under §6321 against an estate beneficiary [dating
from before testator's death] is not defeated by the beneficiary's
disclaimer under Texas probate law. To the same effect under
Pennsylvania law, Tinari v. United States, 96-2 U.S.T.C. 50,460, 78
AFTR2d 96-5349 (E.D. Pa. 8/15/96) (the court rejects the "fiction"
that a disclaimer relates back to the time of death because
beneficiary had a vested property interest at the moment of death).
13. *It is bull to say that the Tax Court doesn't have
equitable recoupment jurisdiction. Estate of Mueller v. Commissioner,
101 T.C. 551 (12/13/93) (reviewed, 13-5). The Tax Court is authorized
to apply the doctrine of equitable recoupment, in order "to allow the
bar of the expired statutory limitation period to be overcome in
limited circumstances in order to prevent inequitable windfalls to
either taxpayers or the Government that would otherwise result from
inconsistent tax treatment of a single transaction, item, or event
affecting the same taxpayer or a significantly related taxpayer," but
"equitable recoupment 'operates [as an affirmative defense] only to
reduce a taxpayer's timely claim for a refund or to reduce the
government's timely claim of deficiency.'" See Bull v. United States,
295 U.S. 247, 35-1 U.S.T.C. 9346 (1935). Neither the absence of an
express statutory grant of jurisdiction under §7442 nor §§6214(b) or
6512(b) bars the Tax Court from considering the doctrine because it
comes within its jurisdiction to redetermine deficiencies. This
decision applied to a claim made by taxpayer when in T.C. Memo. 1992-
284, the Tax Court raised the valuation of stock previously sold by
the estate on which gain had been reported based upon the lower
valuation set forth in the estate tax return.
a. . . . but recopument not allowed when there was
no estate tax liability to be offset by the overpayment of income tax
on gain from sale of asset whose value was increased by the Tax Court.
Estate of Mueller v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. No. 13 (11/5/96)
(reviewed, 12-5). Judge Ruwe's majority opinion held that where no
additional tax was due from the estate, "there is no liability against
which equitable recoupment can be used to defend." Judge Beghe's
dissent concluded that a taxpayer's overpayment status is no obstacle
to recoupment.
14. Pen Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. No. 14
(11/6/96). The Tax Court held that it lacks jurisdiction under §6214
to redetermine a corporation's liability for increased interest on
large corporate overpayments (imposed under §6221(c)).
XII. TAX SHELTERS
A. In General
1. A rare taxpayer victory in a shelter case. Sacks v.
Commissioner, 69 F.3d 982, 95-2 U.S.T.C. T50,586 (9th Cir. 10/31/95),
rev'g and remanding T.C. Memo. 1992-596. Sale-leasebacks of solar
energy devices were not sham transactions, based upon taxpayer's
personal liability for the entire purchase price, the lack of grossly
inflated price [price was mid-range], and possible profitability on an
after-tax basis. The court rejected the argument that absence of pre-
tax profitability indicates lack of economic substance; it stated that
Congress purposely used tax incentives to change investors' conduct
and the government should not "take away with the executive hand what
it gives with the legislative."
2. Oral settlement in Tax Court proceeding was not worth
the paper it wasn't written on. Allen v. United States, 96-1 U.S.T.C.
950,172 (Fed. Cir. 2/27/96) (2-1). Taxpayer deducted $40,000 in 1980
based upon a gold-mining tax shelter investment of $10,000 cash and a
$30,000 promissory note. Taxpayer and Appeals were in conflict whether
the $30,000 was deductible in 1980 or in the year of payment. Taxpayer
orally agreed to the Appeals position and judgment was entered against
taxpayer for the 1980 tax due on the disallowed $30,000 deduction.
Taxpayer later attempted to deduct the $30,000 in an amended return
for 1986 [which was the year taxpayer made payment on the promissory
note]. Held, there was never an agreement as to the year in which the
payment could be deducted, so there was no enforceable agreement
permitting taxpayer to take the deduction, although taxpayer settled
another 1980 gold-mining tax shelter controversy on the basis of
deductibility of payment on the promissory note in the year payment
was made. (The question of whether Tax Court settlements affecting
years other than those before the Tax Court are ever enforceable
absent compliance with the §7121 closing agreement procedure was not
reached by the court.) Dissent on the ground that the incomplete
paperwork was either "simple oversight or sharp practice" -- with
sharp practice being "inconceivable" -- so the courts should be able
to intervene to remedy the oversight.
XIII. WITHHOLDING AND EXCISE TAXES
A. Employee/Independent Contractor
1. Section 3508 applied to direct sellers. Smoky Mountain
Secrets, Inc. v. United States, 910 F. Supp. 1316, 95-2 U.S.T.C.
5.0,573 (E.D. Tenn. (9/28/95). Telemarketers and delivery persons [who
worked on commission, and were not paid for unsuccessful attempted
deliveries or for deliveries where the customer refused to pay] for a
Tennessee gourmet food seller were independent contractors because
they were a "direct sellers" under §3508, which requires (1) sales of
consumer products in the home or other than from a permanent retail
establishment, (2) substantially all remuneration was commissions, and
(3) services must be performed pursuant to a written contract.
2. Hospital Resource Personnel, Inc. v. United States, 68
F.3d 421, 95-2 U.S.T.C. 50,594 (11th Cir. 11/3/95). Provider of
specialized nurses to hospitals in need of temporary additional
staffing established a reasonable basis under §530 of the Revenue Act
of 1978 for treating the nurses as independent contractors, falling
within the safe haven of §530(a) (2) in two respects: (1) judicial
precedent, a published ruling and "technical advice" of several
attorneys and a CPA [sic!!]; and (2) the common law factors indicating
a lack of control of the manner and means of the nurses' work.
District court's permanent injunction against IRS collection of
remaining employment taxes assessed violated the §7421 Anti-Injunction
Act.
3. Boles Trucking Inc. v. United States, 77 F.3d 236, 96-
1 U.S.T.C. 50,112 (8th Cir. 2/22/96). The burden of proof on taxpayer
asserting a "reasonable basis" for improper classifying employees as
independent contractors under §530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 is the
same "preponderance of the evidence" standard that exists for other
tax cases, not the standard contained in the instruction given,
"[taxpayer] need only show that the evidence of a reasonable basis is
just as likely true than not true. In other words, even if the
evidence weighs out evenly, you must find that [taxpayer] had a
reasonable basis ..
4. IRS releases draft training manual on worker
classification (including the relief available under §530 of the
Revenue Act of 1978) (2/28/96). With respect to §530, before that
provision can become an issue, the worker must be an employee under
§3121(d) but the employer need not concede or agree to the
determination in order for §530 relief to be available. With respect
to industry practice, taxpayer must show how it knew the industry
practice and when it knew it (taxpayer cannot have relied on industry
practice if it did not become aware of it until after beginning to
treat workers as independent contractors).
5. Springfield v. United States, 88 F.3d 750, 96-2
U.S.T.C. 50,354 (9th Cir. 7/3/96). Salesmen working in independent
used car dealerships were independent contractors under §530 of the
Revenue Act of 1978, reversing the district court conclusion to the
contrary because it was based only on evidence that franchise
dealerships that sell used cars treated their salesmen as employees
(and did not contradict taxpayer's evidence that independent
dealerships in the San Diego area generally treated their salesmen as
independent contractors). "When the government ignores a taxpayer's
contentions as to the real world conditions of the marketplace,
despite the requirements of Congress that it consider them, it invites
the result reached here."
6. Newspaper distributors and carriers are §3508 direct
sellers. SBT §1118 amends §3508 by treating newspaper (or shopping
news) distributors and carriers as "direct sellers," who are eligible
to treat workers as independent contractors, effective for services
performed after 12/31/95.
7. Relief from employment taxes under §530 of the Revenue
Act of 1978. SBT §1122 modifies §530 of the Revenue Act of 1978, to
provide, inter alia, that employee classification is not a
prerequisite to obtaining the benefits of that provision, but that a
post-1966 audit may not be relied upon unless it included an
examination for employment tax purposes. Effective 1/1/97, without
inference of the proper treatment for disputes from earlier periods.
B. Excise Tax
1. Excise tax on insurance premiums paid to foreign
insurers on exported goods is unconstitutional under the Export
Clause. International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 59
F.3d 1234, 95-2 U.S.T.C. 170,048 (Fed. Cir. 7/10/95). Section 4371,
which imposes a four percent excise tax on the premiums paid to
foreign insurers, is invalid as it is applied to casualty insurance on
goods in the export stream by reason of the Export Clause of the
Constitution (Article I, Section 9, Clause 5, ["No Tax or Duty shall
be laid on Articles exported from any State."]) because it is in
effect a tax upon the exported products themselves.
a. Affirmed by the Supreme Court. United States v.
International Business Machines Corp., - S. Ct. ___, 116 S. Ct.
1793, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 70,059 (U.S. 6/10/96) (6-2). The opinion of the
Court stated that the Export Clause, in broad language, expressly
prohibits Congress from laying any tax or duty on exports. Justice
Thomas rejected the government's argument that the Framers intended
the Clause to narrowly alleviated the fear of northern repression
through taxation of southern exports by prohibiting only
discriminatory taxes, and stated that the better reading is that the
Framers sought to alleviated their concerns by completely denying to
Congress the power to tax exports at all.
2. Luxury automobile tax. SBT § 1607 extends the
phasedown of the §4001 luxury passenger automobile tax from 1999 to
2002.
3. Too late to buy your airline tickets for 1996, but not
too late to buy them for 1997. SB §1609 re-imposes the airport trust
fund excise taxes at pre-1996 rates through 12/31/96, effective 7 days
after enactment.
XIV. TAX LEGISLATION
A. Enacted
1. Lobbying expenditure reporting. P.L. 104-65 (S. 1060),
109 Stat. 691, Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 was signed by President
Clinton on 12/19/95. The (Istook Amendment) provision that would have
prohibited federal grants to §501(c)(4) (social welfare] organizations
which lobby the federal government was eliminated. Section 15 of the
Act permits lobbying organizations to report on their expenditures to
Congress by making good faith estimates based on the tax reporting
system.
2. State income taxation of pension income. P.L. 104-95
(H.R. 394), 109 Stat. 979 [codified at 4 U.S.C. §114], which prohibits
a state from imposing income taxation on "retirement [pension] income"
of a retiree who is no longer a resident or domiciliary of that state,
signed by President Clinton on 1/10/96.
3. The Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 ("T2"), P.L. 104-168,
was signed by President Clinton on 7/30/96.
4. Small Business Job Protection Act *of 1996 ("Small
Business Tax Act" or "SBT"), P.L. 104-188, was signed by President
Clinton on 8/20/96.
5. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 ("Health Act" or "HIPAA"), P.L. 104-191, was signed by
President Clinton on 8/21/96.
6. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("Welfare Reform Act"), P.L. 104-193, was
signed by President Clinton on 8/22/96.
B. Vetoed
1. Contract With America. H.R. 1215, the Contract With
America Tax Relief Bill of 1995, passed by the House on 4/5/95;
included in H.R. 2491, the Seven Year Balanced Budget Reconciliation
Bill of 1995, vetoed by President Clinton on 12/6/95.
